The Clean Air Act of 1963: Postwar Environmental Politics and the Debate Over Federal Power by Orford, Adam D.
Hastings Environmental Law Journal 
Volume 27 
Number 2 Summer 2021 Article 2 
Summer 2021 
The Clean Air Act of 1963: Postwar Environmental Politics and the 
Debate Over Federal Power 
Adam D. Orford 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_environmental_law_journal 
Recommended Citation 
Adam D. Orford, The Clean Air Act of 1963: Postwar Environmental Politics and the Debate Over Federal 
Power, 27 Hastings Envt'l L.J. 1 (2021) 
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_environmental_law_journal/vol27/iss2/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Environmental Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings 





The Clean Air Act of 1963:  
Postwar Environmental Politics  
and the Debate Over Federal Power 
 
 Adam D. Orford* 
 
ABSTRACT  
 This Article explores the development of the Clean Air Act of 1963, 
the first law to allow the federal government to fight air pollution rather 
than study it. The Article focuses on the postwar years (1945-1963) and 
explores the rise of public health medical research, cooperative federalism, 
and the desire to harness the powers of the federal government for domestic 
social improvement, as key precursors to environmental law. It examines 
the origins of the idea that the federal government should “do something” 
about air pollution, and how that idea was translated, through drafting, 
lobbying, politicking, hearings, debate, influence, and votes, into a new 
commitment to a national program to end air pollution in the United States. 
In addition to presenting new perspectives on this understudied period in 
the development of environmental law, it is hoped that this work will shed 
some light on the nature of political opposition to environmental regulation, 
which today is one of the greatest challenges to effective pollution control. 
  
 
*  Ph.D. Candidate, U.C. Berkeley Energy and Resources Group 2021; MPP/MA 
(Energy & Resources) U.C. Berkeley 2018, J.D. Columbia 2006. I am grateful to the Energy 
& Resources Group for the research grant to begin this project, and to the John F. Kennedy 
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On December 11, 1963, the 88th Congress enacted a law “to improve, 
strengthen, and accelerate programs for the prevention and abatement of air 
pollution.”1 Press reports focused on the new law’s allocation of $95 
million ($800 million today2) for federal grants-in-aid to state pollution 
control programs, and it was typically framed as an incremental extension 
of the 1955 Air Pollution Control Act, which had piloted federal-state 
cooperative air pollution research at a smaller scale. Less remarked upon at 
the time, however, the new law also permitted the U.S. federal government 
to fight air pollution in American cities for the first time. This new authority 
– wrapped though it had been inside layer upon layer of procedural 
safeguards to ensure it would be difficult to use – was recognized both by 
its authors and by its opponents as a significant expansion of federal power. 
Only a single newspaper bothered to mention the law’s official name: the 
Clean Air Act of 1963 (the “1963 Act”).3 
The 1963 Act remains obscure and understudied today,4 existing as it 
does under the shadow of the comprehensive 1970 amendments that form 
the foundation of U.S. national air pollution law to this day.5 The 1963 Act 
is recognized as a contributor to the development of state regulatory 
programs, but otherwise as an ineffective precursor to more modern, 
 
1.   Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963) (the “1963 Act”) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2020)). 
2.    All dollar equivalencies calculated using the U.S Inflation Calculator, 
https://perma.cc/LM6U-RDDK. 
3.    The short title is found at 1963 Act § 14, 77 Stat. 392, 401. For a typical report 
on the bill’s passage, see Johnson Signs Fund Bill to Help States Fight Air Pollution, 
APPLETON POST-CRESCENT, Dec. 17, 1963, at 1. Reporters in jurisdictions most active in air 
pollution control did note the enforcement elements. See, e.g., John H. Averill, House 
Approves Bill Giving U.S. Broad Smog Authority, THE LOS ANGELES TIMES, Dec. 11, 1963, 
at 3; Pollution Control Gets Teeth, THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Dec. 13, 1963, at 34. The 
one paper to mention the short title (based on searches of newspapers.com and ProQuest) 
was the Los Angeles Times. Robert C. Toth, U.S. Moves to Combat Increasing Air 
Pollution: Federal Government Given New Powers as Contamination Bill Hits $11 Billion 
Year, THE LOS ANGELES TIMES, Dec. 22, 1963, at B2. 
4.   There is very little literature on the 1963 Clean Air Act. The best is Randall P. 
Ripley, Congress and Clean Air: The Issue of Enforcement, 1963, in CONGRESS AND URBAN 
PROBLEMS (1969). However, as discussed infra note 105, Ripley is a challenging source 
because it contains no citations. Unfortunately, nothing more recent has improved on it. 
Compare Arthur C. Stern, History of Air Pollution Legislation in the United States, 32 J. 
AIR POLLUT. CONTROL ASSOC. 44–61 (1982). CHRISTOPHER J. BAILEY, CONGRESS AND AIR 
POLLUTION: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES IN THE USA 103–08 (1998). Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., 
The Legislative History of U.S. Air Pollution Control, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 679–741, 689–90 
(1999). Christopher D. Ahlers, Origins of the Clean Air Act: A New Interpretation, 45 
ENVTL. L. 75–127, 84–94 (2015). WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., 1 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 169–
184 (1986). 






successful legislation – that is, in comparison to the 1970 Act and its long 
decades of subsequent amendments and execution. However, while these 
comparisons are not unwarranted, this Article argues that they are 
insufficient, and that the 1963 Act stands on its own as a landmark 
environmental law, because it overcame the resistance to treating air 
pollution as a federal problem. It was a “foot in the door” toward a robust 
national air pollution enforcement program, a signature environmental 
legislative achievement of the Kennedy Administration, and a surprising 
outcome in a legislative context that was hostile to the expansion of federal 
power. 
 To put the 1963 Act into its proper context, this Article proceeds in 
two Parts: 
 
§ Part I provides background. Section I.A explores the physical and 
social trends and circumstances that defined air pollution as a policy 
problem circa 1960. Section I.B examines the relevant interests 
involved in air pollution – players in a world pre-dating the words 
“environmentalist” and “environmentalism” in their modern senses. By 
the end of Part I, the reader should have a clearer feeling for the world 
of air pollution politics circa 1960, when it was first suggested that a 
federal agency should have the authority to clean it up. 
 
§ Part II describes the development of federal air pollution law, from its 
genesis through what would become the Clean Air Act of 1963, 
tracking in detail the bills, advocacy, hearings, and legislative actions 
that produced the text of the final law. The Part begins by examining 
the development of federal air pollution control legislation between 
1948 and 1958. It then examines the development, from year to year, 
of the legislative proposals that would eventually form the Clean Air 
Act of 1963. Throughout the discussion, the Article focuses on the 
debate over the appropriate role of the federal government in air 
pollution control, and particularly on whether it should have any 
independent power to fight air pollution on its own authority, without 
permission from or interference by state or local governments.  
 
A key theme throughout is the ongoing role of conservative politics 
in the development of air pollution control law during this period. Federal 
entry into the air pollution problem space was a departure from the past, 
and conservative opposition consistently defined the scope of the law. This 
Article arose out of a larger project to examine the development of anti-






1945 and 1981.6 I found that, prior to developing that thesis, I needed to 
build out the history of environmental regulatory programs during the same 
period, because existing materials simply did not shed enough light on the 
physical, social, or political contexts within which early oppositions 
developed.7 To bring the period to life, I chose to focus on the Clean Air 
Act of 1963 – itself rarely examined – and this Article is the result.  
This Article also reflects my interest in expanding the analytical tools 
used to study environmental legislation. In particular, the last twenty years 
have seen enormous advances in our understanding of postwar U.S. society 
and politics. Scholars have increasingly recognized the sustained 
importance of conservative countercurrents in U.S. politics and culture. 
There is an ongoing project to update political histories to account for these 
new perspectives, and environmental legal scholarship should benefit from 
these advances. This is especially important in today’s world of sustained 
political assault on environmental regulation.8 
Finally, this Article seeks to complicate and deepen the stories told 
about the U.S. environmental movement and environmental law – to move 
away from heroic narratives and toward a more contingent, messy, and 
realistic understanding of legislative development. We may imagine that 
Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring triggered the movement, or that Congress 
 
6.   Prior quality studies of conservative opposition to environmental law and 
regulation include JAMES MORTON TURNER & ANDREW C. ISENBERG, THE REPUBLICAN 
REVERSAL: CONSERVATIVES AND THE ENVIRONMENT FROM NIXON TO TRUMP (2018); 
JACQUELINE VAUGHN SWITZER, GREEN BACKLASH: THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL OPPOSITION IN THE U.S. (1997); Alex Boynton, Formulating an Anti-
Environmental Opposition: Neoconservative Intellectuals during the Environmental 
Decade, 8 THE SIXTIES 1–26 (2015).  
7.   Quality overviews of the environmental policy, politics, and regulation in the 
United States often do not focus much on the postwar years. E.g., RICHARD N. L. ANDREWS, 
MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING OURSELVES: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (3d ed. 2020).; SAMUEL P. HAYS & BARBARA D. HAYS, BEAUTY, 
HEALTH, AND PERMANENCE ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1955-1985 
(1987). There has been more recent interest in the period, however. E.g., CHAD MONTRIE, 
THE MYTH OF SILENT SPRING: RETHINKING THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM 
(2018); THOMAS G. SMITH, STEWART L. UDALL: STEWARD OF THE LAND (2017); J. R. 
MCNEILL ED. & CORINNA R. UNGER ED., ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORIES OF THE COLD WAR 
(2010); ADAM ROME, THE BULLDOZER IN THE COUNTRYSIDE: SUBURBAN SPRAWL AND THE 
RISE OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM (2001). 
8.   On the project to incorporate conservatism into U.S. political history generally, 
and environmental history specifically, see Kim Phillips-Fein, Conservatism: A State of the 
Field, 98 J. AM. HIST. 723–743 (2011). Among the many excellent recent political histories 
of U.S. conservatism see JEFFERSON DECKER, THE OTHER RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2016); 
DARREN DOCHUK, FROM BIBLE BELT TO SUNBELT: PLAIN-FOLK RELIGION, GRASSROOTS 
POLITICS, AND THE RISE OF EVANGELICAL CONSERVATISM (2011); KIM PHILLIPS-FEIN, 
INVISIBLE HANDS: THE BUSINESSMEN’S CRUSADE AGAINST THE NEW DEAL (2010); THOMAS 
W. EVANS, THE EDUCATION OF RONALD REAGAN: THE GENERAL ELECTRIC YEARS AND THE 
UNTOLD STORY OF HIS CONVERSION TO CONSERVATISM (2006); LISA MCGIRR, SUBURBAN 






passed the Clean Water Act in response to the Cuyahoga river fire, but these 
are, perhaps obviously, massive oversimplifications. In the same fashion, 
we may imagine that Richard Nixon was the primary political proponent of 
federal environmental law between 1968 and 1972 because he was the 
president then and worked hard to claim the credit; or even that Senator 
Edmund Muskie was because he chaired a key Senate committee and did a 
great deal to build support for federal environmental legislation (and 
worked hard to claim the credit too), but many, many other people shared 
the legislative laboring oar. This is especially clear in the postwar period in 
the air pollution context.9 
I. AIR POLLUTION IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1960 
Today, the most common window into the air pollution landscape 
circa 1960 is provided by digital articles recalling the work of the EPA’s 
1971 Documerica project. Typically, these writeups will contain images of 
smoggy city centers, most often Los Angeles, and will remark upon the 
value of the EPA and pollution control laws given the drastically improved 
environmental quality we enjoy today. The Documerica project was one of 
several important early environmental policy communications initiatives, 
and the current writeups are valuable examples in a similar genre.10 
 
9.   On Nixon, see J. BROOKS FLIPPEN, NIXON AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2000). On 
Muskie, see Joel K. Goldstein, Edmund S. Muskie: The Environmental Leader and 
Champion, 67 ME. L. REV. 226–233 (2014); Robert F. Blomquist, In Search of Themis: 
Toward the Meaning of the Ideal Legislator - Senator Edmund S. Muskie and the Early 
Development of Modern American Environmental Law, 1965-1968, 28 WM. & MARY 
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 539–658 (2003); Robert F. Blomquist, Senator Edmund S. Muskie 
and the Dawn of Modern American Environmental Law: First Term, 1959-1964, 26 WM. & 
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 509–612 (2001); Robert F. Blomquist, To Stir up Public 
Interest: Edmund S. Muskie and the U.S. Senate Special Subcommittee’s Water Pollution 
Investigations and Legislative Activities, 1963-66 - A Case Study in Early Congressional 
Environmental Policy Development, 22 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1–64 (1997). For studies 
encompassing key Congressional players see, e.g., PAUL CHARLES MILAZZO, UNLIKELY 
ENVIRONMENTALISTS: CONGRESS AND CLEAN WATER, 1945-1972 (2006); BAILEY, supra 
note 4.  
10.   E.g., Alan Taylor, DOCUMERICA: Images of America in Crisis in the 1970s, 
THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 16, 2021), https://perma.cc/4AQK-N3YN; Jialu Chen, Photos of 
Smoggy 1970s America, MOTHER JONES (DEC. 14, 2011), https://perma.cc/52E3-5NEQ. 
Today’s online interest in Documerica was the result of a successful joint archive 
digitization project and promotional effort by the National Archives and EPA, which put 
15,000 vintage photographs online, and created public interest using a student contest that 
was overshadowed by press writeups. See NARA and EPA Launch Documerica-inspired 
Student Multimedia Contest, RURAL COMMUNITY ASSISTANCE PARTNERSHIP (Nov. 11, 
2011), https://perma.cc/5ADB-G8G8. For early public communications efforts, see Public 
Health Service (“PHS”), Free Films on Air Pollution, PHS Pub. No. 1264 (1969); PHS, No 
Laughing Matter: The Cartoonist Focuses on Air Pollution, PHS Pub. No. 1561 (1966); 






However, the Documerica images are not adequate to set the stage for 
the 1963 Act. The photos were taken almost a decade later, at the request 
of a government agency that did not yet exist, as part of a larger social 
movement that also did not yet exist. In addition, such images are static, 
and do not capture the extent to which things were changing, or not 
changing, at the time they were taken. To provide this larger context, 
Section A introduces the rapidly changing postwar world of 1950-1960, 
and identifies several key trends that, together, generated a rising demand 
for a strengthened governmental response to the air pollution problem.  
A. THE PACE OF CHANGE 
The 1950s were a period of extraordinary industrialization, 
urbanization, and growth accentuated by the general baseline of almost 
constant U.S. expansion.11 In absolute population terms, by 1960 the 
postwar baby boom had pushed the U.S. population from 151 million to 
179 million, meaning an unprecedented 28 million additional people 
(+18%) in ten years.12 This growth was essentially uniform across racial 
and socioeconomic classes, but geographically it was concentrated almost 
entirely in newly developed suburban areas. That is, patterns of population 
movement – including the ongoing movement of African Americans to 
northern cities, and of white urban populations to the suburban periphery, 
subject to both de jure and de facto racial and socioeconomic segregation 
– meant that the nation’s urban-suburban geography, where 70 percent of 
the people now lived, was increasingly separated into primarily white 
middle-class suburban peripheries and increasingly Black and relatively 
poor urban city centers, but with much of the suburban population still 
commuting to the city centers.13 At the same time, median real annual 
 
11.   This Article approaches the twentieth-century United States as a product of the 
technological innovations of the late nineteenth century. See VACLAV SMIL, CREATING THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY: TECHNICAL INNOVATIONS OF 1867-1914 AND THEIR LASTING IMPACT 
(2005); Joel Mokyr, The Second Industrial Revolution, 1870-1914, in STORIA 
DELL’ECONOMIA MONDIALE 219 (Valerio Castronovo ed., 1999). With respect to postwar 
growth, there are many economic histories of the United States, all of which recognize the 
importance of the Great Depression, the New Deal, and World War II as contributing 
factors. See, e.g., Price V. Fishback, The New Deal in American Economic History, in 2 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY (Louis P. Cain et al. eds., 2018); 
Taylor Jaworski & Price V. Fishback, Two World Wars in American Economic History, in 
2 OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY (Louis P. Cain et al. (eds.), 2018).  
12.   U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1961, 5 
(82d ed. 1961). 
13.   Id. at 21–22. Between 1950 and 1960, the U.S. urban population increased from 
96 to 125 million. See id. at 22. However, the census definition of “urban” began 
incorporating suburban developments in the 1950 census. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. 
Census History, Urban and Rural Areas, https://perma.cc/7Z93-BXL2. In fact, the growth 







family income had increased from $3,300 ($35,000 today) in 195014 to 
$5,600 ($48,500 today) in 1960 (+39%),15 and unemployment had held 
steady around 5.5 percent for the entire decade.16 Similarly, business was 
booming, with overall gross national product increasing by 93 percent over 
ten years.17 Thus, even accounting for a recession in the late 1950s, and the 
widespread inequalities hidden beneath these averages, the decade was, by 
many measures, a prosperous and affluent one in the United States. 
This remarkable growth, however, was itself outpaced by concurrent 
intensifications in consumption and production that combined to magnify 
the population’s environmental impact. With respect to consumption, this 
was largely intentional—the nation’s entire postwar economic policy (and 
much of its social policy) was built around increased individual 
consumption.18 As one highly relevant example, between 1950 and 1960 
the number of automobiles registered in the United States increased from 
40 to 60 million (+50%), meaning not only that there were more people 
with cars, but also that there were more cars per person, a pattern that 
repeated itself across the entire economy.19 These goods had to be 
 
Academies, Commuting in America III at xiv (2007). For a deeper analysis of the 
suburbanization process in this era, see ROSALYN BAXANDALL & ELIZABETH EWEN, PICTURE 
WINDOWS: HOW THE SUBURBS HAPPENED (2000). 
14.    U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME OF FAMILIES AND PERSONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES: 1950, Rep. No. P60-09 (1952), https://perma.cc/54Z6-BZWH. 
15.    U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME OF FAMILIES AND PERSONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES: 1960, Rep. No. P60-37 (1962), https://perma.cc/E5P2-6TVQ Acknowledging the 
significant and persistent racial inequalities in the United States during this period and 
beyond, median annual real income for nonwhite families increased from $1,869 ($20,000 
today) in 1950 to $3,230 ($28,000 today) in 1960, a 40% increase. Compare id. at Table 3 
with U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 1950, supra note 14. There was also a significant urban-rural 
disparities, with rural median annual non-farm income increasing from $3,000 ($32,000 
today) in 1950 to $5,600 ($48,500 today) in 1960, and rural median annual farm family 
income increasing from $2,000 in 1950 to $2,875 ($25,000) in 1960.  
16.    U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Data Series LNU04000000: Labor Force 
Statistics from the Current Population Survey - Unadjusted Unemployment Rate, Age Over 
16, https://perma.cc/TP2H-7BC7. 
17.    U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Gross National Product, FRED, 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, https://perma.cc/HCH9-NPLP. 
18.   On fiscal policy, see BENN STEIL, THE BATTLE OF BRETTON WOODS: JOHN 
MAYNARD KEYNES, HARRY DEXTER WHITE, AND THE MAKING OF A NEW WORLD ORDER 90–
91 (2013). On consumption in society, see LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMER’S REPUBLIC: THE 
POLITICS OF MASS CONSUMPTION IN POSTWAR AMERICA (2004).  
19.    U.S. FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION OFFICE OF HIGHWAY INFORMATION 
MANAGEMENT, HIGHWAY STATISTICS SUMMARY TO 1995: MOTOR-VEHICLE REGISTRATIONS, 
1900-1995 (TABLE MV-200), https://perma.cc/YV2S-UNFC. See also U.S. BUREAU OF 
LABOR STATISTICS, 100 YEARS OF U.S. CONSUMER SPENDING: DATA FOR THE NATION, NEW 
YORK CITY, AND BOSTON, Rep. No. 991 at 21–32 (2006). That these consumption patterns 
were unequally distributed by race in the 1950s may be inferred from the salary data 






produced, packaged, transported, retailed, and consumed, and all of that 
activity required natural resource inputs and created waste.20  
This profound intensification was combined with a shift in production 
processes and technologies that contributed to an additional three-fold 
environmental impact: (1) increased combustion for production energy, (2) 
increased combustion for use energy, and (3) new, inorganic, and otherwise 
non-biodegradable waste streams from synthetic materials. For example, 
the shift from glass to plastic bottles involved higher-intensity energy and 
resource inputs per produced unit, increased per-capita unit production 
from disposability, and new inorganic waste streams from the plastic. 
Chemical pesticides, detergents, automobiles, and electrical appliances all 
involved higher energy manufacturing, increased fuel consumption to use, 
and new waste streams.21 
This combined consumption and production intensification was 
discernible in the nation’s overall energy use, which increased from 9,700 
terawatt-hours (“TWh”) in 1950 to 13,000 TWh in 1960 – +34 percent 
absolute, +13 percent per capita.22 The vast majority of this energy use 
involved some sort of combustion, particularly of coal (for electricity, 
industrial processes, and, decreasingly, home heating), natural gas 
(increasingly for home heating), and petroleum products (especially in 
transportation fuels), all of which involved waste byproducts emitted into 
the air. Thus, national air pollution quantities increased from 1950 to 
1960.23 
 
20.   On rising municipal waste, see NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES AND THE U.S. 
CONFERENCE OF MAYORS SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE, CITIES AND THE 
NATION’S DISPOSAL CRISIS 1 (Mar. 1973). 
21.   This is the main thesis in BARRY COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE: NATURE, 
MAN, AND TECHNOLOGY 140–77 (1971). Commoner argued that technological 
developments were the primary or, in some interpretations, only important contributors to 
the era’s pollution problems. This was famously disputed, and efforts to define the relative 
contributions to pollution of population, affluence, and technology factors have continued 
ever since. See generally Marian R. Chertow, The IPAT Equation and Its Variants, 4 J. IND. 
ECOL. 13–29 (2000). 
22.   History of energy consumption in the United States, 1775–2009, U.S. ENERGY 
INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (Feb. 9, 2011), https://perma.cc/9425-WU6R. (The per 
capita figure is derived as (13,000 TWh / 179 million people) / (9700 TWh/151 million 
people) = (72.6 TWh/million people) / (64.2 TWh/million people) = 1.13.) 
23.   National sampling data are only available beginning in 1961, see Historic Air 
Quality Trends Reports, U.S. EPA, https://perma.cc/X45S-32MT (Nov. 3, 2017). For 
estimates of pollutant emissions between 1950 and 1960, see U.S. EPA OFFICE OF AIR 
QUALITY PLANNING AND STANDARDS, NATIONAL AIR POLLUTANT EMISSION TRENDS, 1900–
1998 at 3-1–3-29 (2000). According to the latter, four of the six “criteria” air pollutants 
increased between 1950 and 1960: carbon monoxide (CO) (+7%), nitrogen oxides (NOx) 
(+40%), volatile organic compounds (VOCs) (+17%), while sulfur dioxide emissions 
remained steady and inhalable course particulate matter less than ten microns (PM10) 






These growth and intensification patterns interacted with other trends 
that impacted air pollution in complex ways. The first was a general 
transition away from the use of coal in cities. Between 1950 and 1960, total 
coal use increased as coal-fired electricity generation almost doubled, but 
coal use in railroads almost disappeared, and urban residential and 
commercial use dropped drastically as homeowners and small businesses 
switched from coal to natural gas for home and boiler heating.24 The 
reasons for this switch were many, but included increased availability and 
falling prices for alternative fuel and equipment. For urban air, this meant 
real progress. In Chicago, for example, “dustfall” (settled particulate 
matter) totaled 350 tons per square mile per month in 1930. By 1960, with 
municipal refuse burn bans adopted and enforced, with natural gas 
replacing coal in local industrial and home heating applications, with 
railroads almost exclusively burning diesel, and with newly operating street 
sweeping programs reducing particulate recirculation, Chicago’s dustfall 
figure had been reduced to 43 tons per square mile.25 It seemed, therefore, 
that modern growth could also bring modern solutions to air pollution.  
The second major trend, however, was photochemical smog. The 
newer petroleum refining and internal combustion engine processes now 
powering the nation’s transportation fleets created high volumes of 
byproducts not prevalent in coal combustion: carbon monoxide (CO), 
nitrogen oxides (NOx), and volatile organic compounds (VOCs), total 
volumes of which all increased in the 1950s. These chemicals react with 
sunlight, and the resulting new chemicals form a visible pall in the air. 
Thus, even as many areas enjoyed diminished smoke impacts from coal 
burning, the transition itself created a new pollution problem with similar 
(but not identical) effects. This was only first understood in 1948, when 
Arie Haagen-Smit discovered the relationship through research in 
California. Even as urban coal combustion waned, smog grew in the same 
cities, and came to places such as Los Angeles that had not previously relied 
on coal.26 
In the aggregate, these patterns – increased population, increased 
suburban development, increased consumption, higher intensity 
production, increased waste and waste burning, increased use of coal for 
electricity production, increased use of natural gas in cities, increased 
petroleum production and refining, and increased suburban-urban driving 
 
24.   Coal Explained: Use of Coal, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION 
(June 1, 2020), https://perma.cc/CLP4-CGVZ. 
25.   Air Pollution: Hearings before the House Health and Safety Subcommittee at 91 
(Mar. 18, 1963) (statement of James V. Fitzpatrick for Richard Daley, Mayor of Chicago) 
[hereinafter March 1963 Hearing]. This hearing is described in further detail infra Section 
II.F.2. 
26.   On Haagen-Smit’s work, see NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, BIOGRAPHICAL 






– meant that by 1960 in the United States more people, more of the time, 
in more places, were being exposed to more air pollution than ever before. 
An influential contemporary study concluded that over 100 million people 
in the United States – more than half the country – were being exposed to 
“problematic” air pollution, with about 43 million people in areas with 
“major” air pollution problems.27 
The governmental resources arrayed against the rising air pollution 
problem were largely local, underfunded, and ineffective. By 1960, a 
contemporary tally reported that there were only 86 local air pollution 
control authorities scattered across the country, with an aggregate 
(nationwide) staff of 876 people, with a total (nationwide) annual budget 
of about $8 million ($70 million today), responsible for pollution control 
activities to protect over 50 million people, i.e., roughly half of those 
thought to be affected. Of these totals, however, Los Angeles alone 
accounted for 373 staff, a $3.4 million budget, and 6 million residents, 
skewing the averages. The majority of these local agencies had only one or 
two staff and annual budgets under $25,000 ($175,000 today).28 As a result, 
these agencies did not have funding to support air quality monitoring, new 
source permitting or review, or abatement and enforcement actions, let 
alone the political clout to impact powerful local or national industries 
contributing to the problem.29 While many public health authorities also 
had taken on air pollution portfolios by this time, they were themselves 
perpetually underfunded, had many other mandates, and employed very 
few technical staff trained in pollution.30  
Even so, however, there had been notable successes. As the budget 
figures indicated, California was a leader at the state level. It had modeled 
legislation to permit inter-jurisdictional air pollution control districts, with 
Los Angeles taking the most advantage of this authority to address its 
notorious automobile smog problem. California had also created a 
statewide air monitoring network, a public research program to understand 
the relative contributions of various sources to pollution, statewide air 
quality standards, and the California Motor Vehicle Pollution Control 
Board, which was beginning to have success inducing national automobile 
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45–73. 
28.   Schueneman, supra note 27, at 121 (Table 6). 
29.   March 1963 Hearing, supra note 25, at 53–55.  






manufacturers to install pollution control devices on new vehicles.31 
Another older model of success was found in St. Louis, Missouri, which 
had forced a switch to cleaner-burning coal in 1940 and sparked national 
interest in municipal smoke abatement. As of 1960, the St. Louis model had 
been most famously adapted in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, which had 
worked with nearby industry and residents to promote cleaner fuels and 
installation of lower-smoke combustion devices.32 The fact remained, 
however, that these examples were significant outliers, and that many 
efforts to adapt their practices to local circumstances elsewhere had failed, 
or never gotten started. Industry, for its part, had been approaching the 
problem voluntarily, but slowly. Although it is tempting to dismiss these 
efforts, industry pointed to over $1 billion ($8.5 billion today) spent on air 
pollution control equipment by 1960. And many said they were committed 
to doing much more. 
At issue in 1960, then, was the relative pace of change. How long 
would it take industry to develop and install the necessary equipment? How 
long for local pollution control districts to get the problem under control, 
state by state and city by city, as had St. Louis and Pittsburgh? And what 
would happen if industries, or state or local governments, declined to act? 
Who would be endangered in the meantime? Was this acceptable? And if 
not, should the federal government do something? In a rapidly changing 
world, as the pace of the response remained relatively sedate, it became a 
target of critique, and of reform. 
None of the above guaranteed change, however. Although more 
people were exposed to air pollution, those worst impacted were also the 
most marginalized members of society. Those in the suburbs may have 
been annoyed at the problem in the city centers, and at any increases in 
pollution in their relatively clean suburban environments, but the fact 
remained that the suburbs were much better than the cities. U.S. residents 
had been suffering air pollution with relatively little complaint for decades. 
What else changed? As discussed in the following sections, the demand for 
further change required a number of conceptual shifts to reframe air 
pollution as a major public problem in need of a national solution. Among 
these was a growing public awareness that polluted air was a serious health 
hazard, and an increased comfort with government intervention as part of a 
“modern” society. The United States had become the most powerful nation 
in the world in part through the expansion of its federal government, from 
the New Deal through World War II, and there were many interested in 
harnessing that massive regulatory potential to improve U.S. society. But 
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doing so would require a fight, because federal intervention into air 
pollution would be, in a word, new, and currents of resistance to reformist 
programs ran deep in U.S society as well. 
B. RELEVANT IDEOLOGIES, INTERESTS, AND ADVOCACIES 
Today, air pollution is understood as an “environmental” problem, 
subject to control by “environmental” laws, subject to advocacy by 
“environmentalists,” and subject to opposition by “anti-environmentalists.” 
These currents may be analyzed through the lens of social movement 
theory, which seeks to understand collective action for social change. But 
today’s “environmentalism” is one of the “new” social movements of the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, and it did not yet exist, as such, in the postwar 
years. Consequently, the laws of the postwar period were not exactly 
“environmental laws.” Rather, the postwar period was a time when the 
ideas that would form environmentalism were all present, but not yet 
clearly combined, and so, to understand the world of environmental law 
before environmentalism, it is necessary to identify what other “-isms” 
were in the air.33  
It may not be a surprise that public health was relevant. But what 
about city management? Engineering? This section seeks to introduce and 
categorize the ideologies, interests, and advocacies that were most relevant 
to air pollution around 1960. It is a summary, and therefore incomplete. It 
is a series of generalizations, and so there are likely to be many 
unaccounted-for exceptions. And it is a discussion of ideas, and thus must 
be open to different interpretations. Nonetheless, laws do not happen in a 
vacuum, and each of these discussions is helpful for understanding the 
eventual development of the 1963 Act. 
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i. Postwar Liberalism and Modern Republicanism 
Relevant to all the other ideas discussed below, it is useful to begin 
by identifying a prevailing paradigm for the place and period – a distinct 
set of concepts about government, and particularly national government, 
that dominated and persisted throughout the period, regardless of the party 
in power, and against which advocacy efforts and dissent could be targeted. 
In the postwar United States, the prevailing governance paradigm can be 
called, for lack of a better term, “liberalism.” 
Much ink has been spilled on what “liberalism” means. For the 
purposes of this discussion, in the context of the postwar United States, 
“liberalism” is understood to be a set of ideas about government defined 
during Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administrations (1933-1945), combining 
earlier currents of Progressive-Era reformism with newer theories of 
political economy that supported government spending to stimulate 
economic growth. It encompassed the programs of the New Deal, World 
War II, the Marshall Plan, the Bretton Woods System, and the Cold War – 
and created a powerful international order aspiring to harness capitalism 
and improve society, to the mutual benefit of both.34 
Although this liberal order found its expression in the Democratic 
Roosevelt and Truman administrations, it also survived the transition to the 
more conservative, Republican, Eisenhower administration. In the 
immediate postwar U.S., the Republican Party was, among other things, a 
bastion of opposition to public spending and federal power. But it also 
included a very strong element of international isolationism, and 
Eisenhower broke strongly against the isolationist wing, in preference to a 
commitment to an expanded peacetime military presence. In power, 
Eisenhower accepted the need for government in domestic social affairs 
and the economy and resisted more activist conservative efforts to 
dismantle national social programs – a middle-of-the-road approach called 
by Eisenhower himself “modern Republicanism.” Facing criticism from 
both the right (for doing too much) and the left (for not doing enough), 
Eisenhower attempted to navigate a middle way that defaulted against 
changing the federal status quo at home.35 
There were two important departures from Eisenhower’s small-
federal approach, both important for air pollution. First, Eisenhower 
ordered the transformation of the existing Federal Security Agency 
 
34.   For a recent general introduction to what “liberalism” has meant in the United 
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(“FSA”), which held all of the federal government’s domestic social 
programs, into a new federal Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(“HEW”). This resolved a long-running debate over whether the FSA 
should continue to exist and ended efforts to reduce the number of federal 
domestic programs running, which was why the FSA was not already a 
department. Among other things, the FSA, and then HEW, contained the 
largely independent U.S. Public Health Service (“PHS”) – which would 
eventually run the federal government’s air pollution program.36 
The second small federal departure was Eisenhower’s decision to 
enforce the court orders following Brown v. Board of Education.37 The U.S. 
had failed spectacularly on its own terms with respect to civil rights for 
African Americans, officially in the segregationist South, and unofficially 
in the redlined north, but this internal tension was not something that 
Eisenhower was eager to resolve. His hand was forced by Judge Ronald N. 
Davies of the Eastern District of Arkansas, who issued an injunction, defied 
by the Arkansas governor, that led Eisenhower to send federalized National 
Guard troops to Little Rock. The action demonstrated the possibilities of 
national power at home and made a deep impression on the Southern 
Democrats, who had written and submitted a “Declaration of Constitutional 
Principles,” more commonly known as the Southern Manifesto, which 
principles included the reserved rights of the states from federal 
encroachment. Among the signatories of this document was Rep. Kenneth 
A. Roberts (D-AL), the chair of the Subcommittee on Health and Safety of 
the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee (the “House Health 
and Safety Subcommittee”), whose support would be necessary to pass the 
Clean Air Act of 1963.38 
It is useful to understand the liberal order and the Eisenhower 
administration’s moderate Republicanism – the acceptance of the New 
Deal state but resistance to further reform; the commitment to domestic 
welfare if only to demonstrate the value of capitalism over communism; 
and the tensions of the brewing civil rights battles and their meaning and 
import to other questions of federal government – to locate the currents of 
change that, against this prevailing paradigm, had closer bearing on the 
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ii. Public Health Institutions and Environmental Concerns 
Of the many influences bearing on government in the 1950s, the most 
important for air pollution was an evolving conception of public health, 
meaning the “[t]he science and the art of preventing disease, prolonging 
life, and promoting physical health and efficiency through organized 
community efforts for the sanitation of the environment . . . [and] the 
development of the social machinery which will ensure to every individual 
in the community a standard of living adequate for the maintenance of 
health.”39 Emerging from the “great sanitary awakening” of the early-
middle nineteenth century, the subsequent discoveries in germ theory in the 
late nineteenth century, and the expansion of public health agencies 
throughout the Progressive Era, U.S. public health in the postwar period 
encompassed a huge array of health-related activities, from hospital 
operation, to quarantine services, to public education, to epidemic 
prevention, and to programs for the eradication of infectious diseases. It 
also involved a great deal of research, and it was this research that was to 
become the most important aspect of public health for air pollution.40 
The traditional institutional structure of U.S. public health reflected 
the nation’s federal structure, with offices for domestic wellbeing 
intentionally located with state and local governments, and federal power 
in the area rather strictly circumscribed. PHS was therefore allowed to 
assist state programs, but national (federal) public health activity was 
fiercely controversial. Efforts in the Roosevelt and Truman administrations 
to develop national health insurance programs fell to sustained opposition 
from the medical profession, which feared economic competition and, later, 
to anti-statists who associated national healthcare with socialist 
government. The primary exception to this general trend was medical 
research, federal funding for which benefited the medical industry without 
competing, and did not raise the specter of planned economies. The 
watershed in this area was the National Cancer Act of 1937, which founded 
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the National Cancer Institute within PHS and set precedent by permitting 
the Surgeon General to award grants to non-federal researchers.41 
As was the case in other matters, World War II then exerted a major 
federalizing influence. The National Cancer Act research grant model 
expanded exponentially under FDR’s wartime Office of Scientific 
Research and Development (“OSRD”), which, in addition to focusing on 
wartime technology, supported innovation to reduce medical casualties 
among the troops. PHS, for its part, was also at its core a military 
organization – a service, led by a Surgeon General – and its work during 
World War II included many efforts to support domestic war production by 
promoting the health of the wartime workforce. In 1944, Congress 
expanded PHS’s health research mandate to non-cancer grant programs, 
and at the end of World War II the OSRD’s medical research 
responsibilities were transferred to PHS as well, expanding and 
consolidating a new and (for the time) quite massive peacetime public 
research program. This portfolio continued to grow throughout the 1950s, 
and by 1960 the NIH research budget had increased to $400 million per 
year ($3.5 billion in today’s dollars).42  
The federal medical research program was a robust platform for 
determining the cause of illness, with substantial support from politically 
powerful sectors. But the production of new knowledge is also an 
inherently political process, and while the health research program was not 
designed to challenge industrialism or capitalism – indeed it had evolved 
from the same administrative structures and incentives that had produced 
revolutions in chemical pesticides, the atomic bomb, and the Cold War 
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aerospace industry – its work increasingly involved problems created by 
industry, and so had the potential to come into conflict with vested 
industrial interests. PHS’s solution to this political problem was to retreat 
behind claims of professionalism and scientific objectivity. Yet, PHS was 
under pressure to produce knowledge in response to a variety of influences 
against which it was never possible to remain entirely neutral. Although 
these pressures cannot necessarily be called “movements,” it is possible to 
identify and summarize a number of health-related advocacies focused on 
information generation that, taken together, can broadly be classified as 
“environmental health” activism.43  
Food safety was a prominent example. The federal government’s role 
dated to the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, as significantly expanded 
during the New Deal. However, with the massive increase in pesticide use 
following World War II, food safety concerns in the 1950s expanded to 
include chemical toxicity, and Congress investigated pesticides in food and 
passed laws intended to limit their concentrations. While the FDA was the 
primary regulator, much of the information underlying this process came 
from PHS’s National Cancer Institute.44 Another prominent example was 
radiation, a distinctly postwar environmental health concern. From 1951 to 
1963, the United States regularly detonated nuclear weapons in New 
Mexico and Nevada, the world increasingly confronted the potential of 
radioactive fallout following nuclear warfare, and researchers were pushing 
forward to harness the atom to produce electricity. PHS, among other 
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things, was called on to investigate illness in the fallout zone and track 
levels of Strontium-90 in milk.45  
PHS was also consistently drawn into disputes between labor and 
capital, and it was in the realm of “industrial hygiene” – now called 
occupational health – that PHS began to develop its expertise around lung 
conditions.46 PHS pioneered studies of silicosis (caused by inhalation of 
silica dust, common in mining and steel manufacture) and asbestos 
illnesses, among dozens of other workplace studies it conducted throughout 
the postwar years.47 Also relevant to lung health, controversy, and industry 
interests, PHS was called upon to evaluate the emerging science on lung 
cancer, meaning it was repeatedly pulled into the highly charged world of 
tobacco politics.48  
With respect to pollution, by the 1950s PHS had been involved for 
decades. Public interest in clean drinking water equaled or exceeded that in 
clean food, and water filtration and chlorination practices had been adopted 
nearly nationwide in the early twentieth century, overcoming the primary 
waterborne health threat – infectious disease. Raw sewage in drinking 
water sources was a public health threat, and the 1948 Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act included huge investments in sewage treatment 
facilities for that reason. PHS was also central to the most controversial 
drinking water issue of the 1950s: fluoridation of public drinking water 
systems. PHS had been a primary source of information about fluoride in 
drinking water since its discovery as an issue, had conducted the first test 
of public water supply fluoridation in 1945, had issued national policy in 
1951, and had supported widespread public drinking water fluoridation 
throughout the 1950s.49 
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In summary, the same processes that created increasing pollution also 
created a national public health research program that became drawn into 
ongoing debates over new chemical health threats. Given PHS’s existing 
interests in determining the causes of cancer, and its occupational studies 
of lung ailments in workers, it should not be surprising that it also became 
involved in investigating the health impacts of outdoor air pollution. How 
exactly that happened is the subject of Section II, infra. What matters here 
is that PHS was generating information that was understood to be relevant 
to, and even dispositive of, questions regarding environmental health and 
held experience at navigating the attendant politics. But it was not actively 
seeking to expand its authority into regulatory enforcement of air pollution. 
That was the province of smoke abatement. 
iii. Smoke Abatement – Engineering and Irrelevance 
In emerging environmental health fields, there were no directly 
competing regulatory structures for public health leaders to displace. Air 
pollution, on the other hand, was perhaps the least modern environmental 
health problem in the United States, and there was already a decades old 
regulatory apparatus occupying the problem space, with a very different 
perspective on the definition of the problem and the available range of 
solutions. It was called “smoke abatement,” and it was the realm of 
engineers with expertise in combustion – particularly coal combustion. 
Understanding the development of national air pollution legislation circa 
1960 requires examining the transformation of smoke abatement into “air 
pollution control,” and the gradual transference of the authority to define 
the air pollution problem space, away from mechanical engineers, to 
medical researchers. 
Between the 1880s and 1940s, coal burning was the primary source 
of smoke in the United States, and thus the primary concern of smoke 
abatement.50 Coal was also, however, an essential input for the railroad, 
marine shipping, and steelmaking industries, and the primary fuel for home 
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heating and small industrial boilers across the entire country.51 Coal smoke, 
then, meant industry, and U.S. governments were more tailored to 
supporting that industry than reducing its impacts. They consequently 
developed a relatively congenial, forgiving, and ineffective cooperative 
approach to coal smoke abatement that, above all else, prioritized 
continuing to burn coal. Associations of mechanical engineers puzzled out 
how to do so as cleanly as possible, but the consistent assumption was that 
it was necessary to keep doing it. The challenge then, to the engineers, 
became how to educate operators of coal-fired equipment on the engineers’ 
newly-developed best burning practices, and how to induce the coal-
burning public and, perhaps, industry, to install equipment that would 
minimize the smoke from their coal fires. It should be noted that these were 
not engineering problems – they were rather problems of technology 
diffusion and public education. Smoke abatement was, then, a sort of 
“public engineering” program.52 
Unlike their colleagues in sanitary engineering, however, the smoke 
engineers were unable to develop a program of centralized treatment works 
that could attract federal funding and Congressional support. Smoke 
engineers appear to have taken as a given that government intervention was 
not appropriate to induce the technology transitions they desired. This was 
also the outlook of the primary federal agency involved in smoke 
abatement: the U.S. Bureau of Mines, which under its general authority to 
investigate health and safety of the mineral industries had become the 
primary national repository for information about smoke abatement. The 
Bureau assisted in the development of the nation’s first model smoke 
ordinance in 1924, and the interests involved may be intuited from the 
members of the workgroup: the American Society of Heating and 
Ventilating Engineers, the Stoker Manufacturers’ Association, and the 
Fuels Division of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, together 
with, lastly, the American Civic Association (a municipal reform 
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organization). The idea was to create a model local law that municipalities 
could adopt, because responsibility for such affairs was a local matter. 
Pointed toward improving coal furnace operation, the law’s sole regulatory 
trigger was smoke opacity, using a tool called the Ringelmann Smoke Chart 
to determine smoke color, which became the foundation of most smoke 
abatement regulatory standards across the country for the next thirty 
years.53 
It still might have worked. Better equipment and processes had been 
developed, and it was possible to greatly reduce visible smoke and to 
capture other harmful components of flue gases. The challenge was that 
success required further government interventions in a system that was not 
well designed for them. To careful observers, this was clear in the story of 
St. Louis, where, after unsuccessful efforts to make progress through 
education and voluntary action, the city had passed a law that controlled 
the quality of the coal that could be burned in the city, required mechanical 
combustion efficiency devices be to installed everywhere, and incorporated 
a successful enforcement program, rendering it “impossible to create 
smoke.”54 It was far more common for model smoke abatement ordinances 
to be adopted without ancillary controls on fuel or equipment, and then to 
be underenforced. Smoke abatement therefore failed repeatedly to resolve 
the problem it was designed to address.55 
Even as smoke abatement was failing to make progress, a new 
understanding of “pollution” was displacing the older idea of “smoke.” 
Smoke abatement, however, failed to expand its regulatory toolset or 
identify any criteria by which it could do so – a vacuum into which public 
health stepped. This was not for lack of understanding: as early as 1915 
“smoke” could be found defined to include not only the visible byproducts 
of combustion, but its invisible gaseous and chemical components as well, 
at least to the extent that they were found to be objectionable by the public. 
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But on what grounds could the public object, or could the government 
regulate? In a memorandum published posthumously in 1938, Bureau of 
Mines engineer O.P. Hood hit upon the tension: 
In the present state of the art the medical profession does not 
furnish a clear definition of what constitutes a harmful 
atmosphere except in regard to very few things . . . Before 
threshold limits can be defined the objectionable characteristics 
of the quantities involved must be known. There is no unanimity 
of opinion on this matter and much remains to be learned. . . . It 
may be that it is sufficient for the present to fall back upon a less 
rational basis of definition. It may be enough to simply say “we 
don’t like it” . . . For the lack of a better basis at present we are 
compelled to recognize such an arbitrary basis for definition, so 
that we define “smoke” as something accompanying combustion 
that the community does not like and define “abatement” as the 
reduction of the amounts involved to the point where the 
community will accept it.56 
That is, as understandings of pollution grew, smoke abatement 
struggled to incorporate conceptions of what the public “does not like” 
beyond visible smoke, because it had no empirical basis for setting 
standards, even though the public manifestly “did not like” air pollution. 
Lacking its own contributions to helping the public define the parameters 
of acceptable air pollution, smoke abatement had no choice but to defer to 
public health to set the standards for public acceptability. As smog 
continued to plague U.S. cities throughout the 1950s, and public health 
research developed increasingly alarming information about air pollution’s 
contributions to health problems, combustion engineers had increasingly 
little to offer. 
In 1951, the Secretary of the Interior submitted an annual report to 
Congress summarizing the Bureau of Mines’ research into the negative 
impacts of pollution. It was two pages devoted to explaining that the 
Department did not have the funds necessary to conduct such work: 
“Nevertheless, I am glad to report that with the very limited funds made 
available from its regular appropriation, the Bureau of Mines has rendered 
constructive service to the Nation in an advisory and consultative capacity,” 
primarily by chairing an Interdepartmental Committee on Air Pollution, 
which produced little.57 
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In the prevailing narration of air pollution control law, smoke 
abatement is often discussed as the predecessor to modern federal air 
pollution legislation. But the modern analogue to smoke abatement would 
be efforts to identify best available control technology for boilers and coal-
fired power plants, an important but ultimately secondary element of a 
much larger program to monitor air quality, set ambient air quality 
standards, determine emission limits for a variety of pollutants, and create 
regulatory programs with teeth to enforce them. With respect to these 
efforts, smoke abatement was largely irrelevant. Others would take the 
lead. 
iv. The Urban Lobby – Visions of a New Federalism 
In the 1950s, air pollution was almost universally understood to be a 
city problem, and therefore, in the parlance of the day’s federalism, a 
“local” problem. This fact had profound consequences for the politics and 
legislation of air pollution in the early 1960s. 
The New Deal had radically transformed the relationship between 
U.S. cities, states, and federal government, by ushering in an era of direct 
city-federal coordination that previously would have been unthinkable. 
Notwithstanding the federal expansions of the Wilson administration, prior 
to 1930 the federal budget was smaller than the collective state budgets – 
which were much smaller than the collective town and city budgets, where 
most domestic decision making and spending occurred. The Great 
Depression, however, was not only a financial disaster for banks and their 
depositors – it was a financial disaster for states and municipalities, as they 
saw their tax revenue dry up at the same time the demand for their public 
financial relief programs increased, drastically. Rather than assist the states, 
however, the New Deal domestic agenda contemplated assisting the states’ 
residents directly, even over the opposition of state governments concerned 
about this new federal intervention into domestic affairs. “Federal-city 
relations grew out of political necessity for bypassing, wherever possible, 
recalcitrant state officials and bureaucracies” to deliver New Deal aid to 
cities and their inhabitants, and this new arrangement elevated cities to a 
nearly equal, and rival, position with the states with respect to the federal 
government.58 By the end of World War II, the federal government’s share 
in domestic spending had exceeded those of the states and municipalities 
combined, and municipalities were poised to continue benefiting from this 
relationship when the more fiscally conservative Eisenhower 
administration reduced their access – if not their organizational capacities.59 
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These developments were the genesis of a powerful “urban lobby.”60 
In the late nineteenth century, municipalities had formed municipal leagues 
in response to state bans on special legislation for cities, requiring laws of 
statewide municipal application, and therefore statewide municipal 
coordination.61 In 1924, ten existing state leagues established the American 
Municipal Association (“AMA”), which operated to share information and 
coordinate municipal advocacy first towards state governments, and later 
nationally.62 The AMA, in turn, assisted in the development of the United 
States Conference of Mayors (“USCM”), a coalition of the mayors of the 
nation’s largest cities founded in 1932 to coordinate city-federal operations 
under the New Deal.63 As the crises of the Great Depression and World War 
II came to an end, the nation’s federal government had more power than 
ever before to provide financial assistance to cities, and the USCM and, 
especially, the AMA, were intent on continuing to advocate for expansions 
to that support.  
During the postwar period, however, cities were changing drastically, 
and this was leading to new demands. At the time, the suburb was the 
primary new physical development – an extension or expansion of the 
central urban core, a physical periphery where largely white, largely 
prosperous urban residents moved for a better standard of living, while still 
dependent on the urban core for employment, but no longer paying city 
property taxes. By the early 1960s, as retailers and employers followed the 
suburbanites outward, economic and job growth was largely occurring 
outside of city centers. This had serious implications for cities themselves, 
which increasingly were drained of their tax bases and unable to function. 
Public perception had not, however, begun to re-characterize central cities 
as crime-ridden wastelands or the needful recipients of federal poverty 
programs. Rather, the “problems of the central cities were viewed as the 
byproducts of exuberant suburban growth, which left outmoded cores in 
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need of redevelopment and physical refurbishing.” The new governing 
paradigm for the city-federal relationship would be “urban renewal.”64 
Urban centers had already been recognized as centers of need during 
the Great Depression. The Housing Act of 1937 had inaugurated a federal 
housing construction program, but this had generated a great deal of 
resistance from private real estate interests opposed to competition from 
public housing and desiring direct federal financial support for themselves 
instead. Thus the 1937 program had been unsuccessful, and programs 
originally developed for the direct government provision of affordable 
housing shifted, under the larger paradigm of Keynesian national economic 
policy, to federal investment for the purpose stimulating economic 
development. This led to the development of a national policy to “save the 
central city” by building a new economy around the razing and rebuilding 
of “blighted” urban areas, often meaning the homes of current residents. 
The Truman-era Housing Act of 1949, as amended during the Eisenhower 
administration, funded primarily commercial redevelopment in older city 
centers, with Philadelphia’s Penn Center and Pittsburgh’s Gateway Center 
complexes as influential models. By 1960, then, these programs, together 
with federal interstate highway development, were transforming previously 
mixed residential, commercial, and industrial city centers into central 
business districts. The urban lobby circa 1960 was interested in any 
opportunity to increase federal investment in this mode.65 
The urban lobby had been aware of air pollution as a problem for 
decades. The American Municipal News, the AMA’s periodical, had 
tracked smoke abatement ordinance innovations for years. By 1960, the 
urban lobby shared an interest in developing solutions to air pollution, an 
understanding that air pollution problems were shared nationally by 
similarly-situated cities, and an established system for requesting federal 
assistance for municipal problems. These would combine to drive the 
specific legislative proposal that became the Clean Air Act of 1963. 
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v. Conservatives – The Skeptical View 
“Conservatism” in the United States is the subject of only slightly less 
spilled ink than “liberalism.” It famously challenges definition, in part 
because it is defined by its relation to other ideas, and in part because, at 
least in the United States in the postwar years, it was defined by struggles 
to define itself. For the purposes of this discussion, it suffices first to note 
that in the postwar United States there were “conservatives” in both the 
Republican and Democratic parties, and that in the Republican Party 
especially there was a transition from the “old guard” conservatism that had 
dominated since about 1912, personified particularly by Sen. Robert A. 
Taft (R-OH), to a “new” and more populist postwar (and Cold War) 
conservatism personified by Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-AZ). The 
conservative elements of both parties formed governing coalitions in 
Congress, with varying degrees of cooperation and success. From within 
this diverse group of interests and ideologies emerged three related, 
overlapping, and self-reinforcing, but distinct, broadly “conservative” 
consensus ideas that would be very relevant to air pollution control: fiscal 
conservatism, anti-statism, and support for capitalism.66  
Fiscal conservatism may be defined as “an agenda of balanced 
budgets, private capital investment, minimal government debt, stable 
currency, low inflation, . . . high savings,” and low taxes.67 Even in the 
1930s, the ideologies behind these policies were varied, but in government 
fiscal constraint was understood both to be popular among the tax-paying 
electorate, and important to policymakers concerned about the “detrimental 
impact of deficits on consumer prices, national savings, and the 
international stability of the dollar,” and with “restoring healthy economic 
conditions, constraining the state, limiting interest groups, and retaining the 
faith of citizens in a disciplined government.”68 Although fiscal 
conservatism found support in both parties, Republicans were especially 
devoted to it, and it was an essential element of the 1952 Republican Party 
platform, which required building a consensus between the isolationist Taft 
and internationalist Eisenhower factions (who won). Eisenhower himself 
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was an enthusiastic budget hawk. Federal spending would constantly 
require justification.69  
Anti-statism may be defined as “the body of ideas and arguments used 
by those who have opposed efforts to increase the size and strength of the 
executive branch of the federal government” in the United States.70 
Although anti-statism is associated with conservative politics, the 
resistance to centralized national power is one of the U.S. Constitution’s 
defining characteristics: the country survived without a strong centralized 
national government for over a century and a half. The “marked anti-statist 
bias” in American government did not disappear even after the World Wars 
and the Great Depression posed enormous challenges to adherents of this 
doctrine.71 Furthermore, anti-statism served vested interests: 
Postwar opposition to the growth of governmental power was 
also, in some cases, merely a by-product of self-interest, rather 
than the result of any serious attempt to establish what was best 
for the country as a whole . . . . Principled postwar anti-statists 
. . . were often motivated by other beliefs . . . . Many southern 
Democrats who favored “states’ rights” and a weaker 
government in Washington were also, not coincidentally, racists; 
some midwestern Republicans who wanted lower taxes, less 
federal regulation, and a smaller defense budget were also, as a 
result, isolationists.72 
What is especially important is that in U.S. politics, appeals to anti-
statist principles have always been powerful, and this was especially the 
case in a time when the nation’s entire identity was being transformed in 
contrast to both authoritarian fascism and world communism. Government 
initiatives, however well intentioned, would be subject to anti-statist 
review. 
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Finally, U.S. fiscal conservatism and anti-statism overlapped with a 
marked pro-capitalist outlook in U.S. society and government. While 
laissez-faire political economy did not have its roots in the U.S. 
Constitution to the same degree as did anti-statism, by the early twentieth 
century the ideal was well established. Business interests, of course, 
promoted capitalism. But by the postwar years free-market capitalism had 
also found strong intellectual proponents looking for an alternative to 
socialism as a set of organizing principals for a good society and 
government. While the degree to which the government should be involved 
in promoting capitalism was debated, capitalism itself was increasingly 
associated with the United States itself, and reform efforts intended to 
constrain business operations were, increasingly, opposed for no other 
reason than what was bad for business was bad for the United States. This 
was the upshot of, for example, the 1937 “conservative manifesto,” and it 
would become a strong political organizing force in business circles, 
including, as is particularly relevant to air pollution, the National 
Association of Manufacturers (“NAM”).73  
It would be circular to define all opposition to federal air pollution 
control legislation as “conservative,” simply because such federal power 
had never existed before, and therefore any effort to create it was 
“reformist” or “progressive,” and thus any effort to oppose it could be said 
to be “conservative” or even “reactionary.” Rather, there were a number of 
pre-existing conservative principles that became implicated when new 
programs were proposed. These were not absolutes, and for examples of 
conservatives supporting new federal pollution control programs one need 
look no further than Robert A. Taft himself, who co-sponsored the 1948 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act. But Taft was also considered among 
his more conservative colleagues to have been becoming increasingly soft 
on social programs. What is clear is that, as advocates for air pollution 
control began their work, they would be required to confront and overcome 
skepticism, justify their programs, and seek to build legitimacy among a 
broad set of often conflicting interests that, in the aggregate, may be 
understood as conservative. 
vi. Other Interests 
Many other elements of U.S. society had a stake in the outcome of air 
pollution discussions. However, very few of them took any significant 
action to create the Clean Air Act of 1963. Before moving to legislative 
history, several of the most important deserve brief explanation. 
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The Conservation Movement. The conservation movement played no 
significant role in air pollution advocacy in the 1950s and early 1960s. As 
explained above, the air pollution problem had become the special concern 
of the “urban lobby,” and conservation at the time was focused on the 
development and protection of wilderness and other scenic resources. 
“They focused on regional or place-specific issues, looking at the 
mountains instead of the cities, at the so-called pristine places instead of 
the communities where people lived.”74 The Sierra Club’s move toward a 
more “environmental” perspective that could encompass air pollution has 
been dated to 1963 and the Diablo Canyon controversy.75 Thus, the only 
conservation organization to comment on the Clean Air Act of 1963 was 
the National Wildlife Federation, which did so only after its input was 
requested by the House Health and Safety committee. The organization’s 
own newsletter barely mentioned air pollution between 1955 and 1963.76 
Although members of the Izaak Walton League and other organizations 
could occasionally be found making positive statements at the local level, 
this did not reflect an organizational commitment to the issue. 
Women’s Groups. Early air pollution legislation has been credited to 
coalitions of “middle-class women's groups, public health officials, and 
physicians.”77 It is true especially that the League of Women Voters 
contributed to early environmental action, and that women’s contributions 
to environmentalism generally are understudied. However, there is little 
evidence that the League was particularly active in air pollution during this 
time. The one major exception is the Pittsburgh chapter, which was one of 
the major players in the coordination of that city’s smoke abatement 
program.78 But this was not replicated elsewhere, and the League never 
appears in efforts to promote federal air pollution control at this time. 
Civil Rights Advocates. The groups and interests who would lead the 
Civil Rights Movement were focused on federal legislative action, but not 
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for air pollution. Although disparate environmental health burdens were a 
discernable and occasionally commented-upon aspect of racialized housing 
segregation patterns during the 1950s and early 1960s, the framework of 
environmental justice, or environmental racism, was not yet developed and 
was not a locus of advocacy or activism at this time.79 
Business. “Business” cannot be treated as monolithic, and business 
involvement in air pollution typically mapped to sectoral interests. For 
example, the cigarette industry was a somewhat surprising early advocate 
for air pollution investigation – because if ambient air pollution was shown 
to contribute to lung cancer, it provided an alternative explanation to the 
cigarette theory of causation.80 Retail businesses operating in urban centers 
would benefit from “urban renewal” programs, but manufacturers creating 
the pollution would not. Producers of fuels and other inputs to fuel-burning 
industry would suffer; those who developed better pollution control devices 
would not.  
In summary, then, the postwar years in the United States were a time 
of great change in ideas about government, related to but different from the 
changes of the 1960s that are most often associated with environmental law. 
These changes had their origins in the past, and particularly in the 
experiences of the New Deal and World War II and were in tension 
especially during the Eisenhower administration. They would find 
expression in the debate over federal air pollution control law between 1948 
and 1963 – the Subject of Part II. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT OF 1963 
Part I examined the social and political forces relevant to the air 
pollution problem in the postwar United States. Part II explores how those 
forces influenced the federal government’s response.  
Section A examines how PHS was first recruited to investigate 
outdoor air pollution in Donora, Pennsylvania, and how the agency 
balanced the political interests at play there. Section B explores PHS’s air 
pollution work between 1949 and 1958, and the rising Congressional 
debate, and conservative concern, over the appropriate role of the federal 
government in air pollution. Sections C through F then examine the debate 
over whether to expand the federal government’s authority to include any 
sort of independent power to reduce air pollution. Section C examines the 
seminal proposal by HEW Secretary Arthur S. Flemming in late 1958, and 
traces how that proposal was delayed in Congress through 1960. Section D 
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examines the transition to the Kennedy Administration and the lobbying by 
the American Municipal Association that created key textual elements of 
the eventual bill in 1961. Section E examines the plans to enact a relatively 
moderate bill in 1962, the key decision to delay that enactment for a year, 
and the emergence of open conflict over the question of federal 
enforcement by the end of the year. Section F then examines the pivotal 
year of 1963, with particular attention to public hearings in the House and 
Senate, and the votes that led to the law’s eventual passage and signing in 
December 1963. 
A. 1948-1949: DONORA 
As explained in Part I, federal engagement with air pollution as a 
health issue can be traced back to early work on smoke abatement by the 
U.S. Bureau of Mines, and early investigations into lung health by PHS’s 
Industrial Hygiene Division. But the public debate over whether and how 
to increase the federal role in the air pollution field can be traced to Donora, 
Pennsylvania – an industrial town outside Pittsburgh. In the last week of 
October 1948, the town was beset by a toxic smog that killed 20 people. 
The disaster made national news.81 
In Donora, calls for a federal investigation into the smog disaster 
began almost immediately, and were always intertwined with questions of 
liability. Although suspicions in the town immediately fell on its major 
industrial facility – U.S. Steel’s Donora Zinc Works – it was not clear who 
could be trusted to investigate these allegations. In the usual course of 
events at the time, local, county, and state public health officers specializing 
in industrial hygiene would investigate, and they did arrive quickly at the 
scene in Donora. But by the time they had come, the killing smog had gone, 
meaning there was little evidence left to examine, and the investigators 
hesitated to blame the zinc works without proof.82 U.S. Steel also proposed 
an investigation by an independent outside consultant but, given its obvious 
conflict of interest, it was not well trusted. In the town, nearly everyone 
relied on the plant for employment, but they were unionized – and six of 
the seven town councilmen were union members. In the immediate 
aftermath, the town therefore held a public meeting to discuss what should 
be done. At that meeting, two prominent figures – Donora Public Health 
Board member Dr. William Rongaus, who had been quoted repeatedly as 
 
81.   On the general facts of the Donora incident, see Elizabeth T. Jacobs, Jefferey L. 
Burgess & Mark B. Abbott, The Donora Smog Revisited: 70 Years After the Event That 
Inspired the Clean Air Act, 108 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH S85, S85–S88 (2018). For the classic 
contemporary telling, see Berton Roueché, The Fog, THE NEW YORKER (Sep. 23, 1950), 
https://perma.cc/V9U6-DDHQ.  
82.  Lynne Page Snyder, “The Death-Dealing Smog over Donora, Pennsylvania”: 
Industrial Air Pollution, Public Health Policy, and the Politics of Expertise, 1948-1949, 18 






likening the deaths in Donora to “murder” by the zinc works, and Frank 
Burke, the Pittsburgh steel union director and recently appointed chair of 
its national committee on worker safety – called for the town to recruit PHS 
to serve as a neutral investigator into the causes of the deaths. The town 
council accepted this proposal and immediately sent PHS a request for 
assistance.83 
Although PHS had a long history investigating health issues related 
to industrial facilities, it was also sensitive to the politics of federal 
intervention and bound by rules relating to state assistance, and so was not 
immediately eager to volunteer itself in Donora.84 Upon receiving the 
town’s message, PHS responded that it was required to wait for the 
appropriate request from state (not local) authority.85 Such an invitation, 
however, was not immediately forthcoming, and in the meantime PHS 
employees speculated publicly that local meteorological conditions had 
likely been to blame – not local industry. It was not until several days later 
that both Pennsylvania and PHS agreed that PHS should be involved, and 
PHS, represented by the head of its industrial hygiene division, agreed to 
travel to Donora to conduct an investigation, but only by setting up 
 
83.  On the Pennsylvania Health Department investigation and the U.S. Steel proposal 
to recruit the “Independent Hygiene Corporation,” see Chemists Study Fatal Smog At 
Donora, Pa., THE EVENING SUN, Nov. 1, 1948, at 2. NB: the “Independent Hygiene 
Corporation” does not appear in Pennsylvania corporate records and is not otherwise 
mentioned in local newspapers of the time, and so may be a misreported name. On the state 
of distrust and statements made at the Donora public meeting, see generally Snyder, supra 
note 82, and see Troy Gordon, U.S. Scientists Asked To Help Solve Mystery of “Death 
Smog,” LUBBOCK MORNING AVALANCHE, Nov. 2, 1948, at 1; Orlo Robertson, Donora Asks 
Federal Check of “Poison” Air, THE AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Nov. 2, 1948, at 35; Ask 
For Air Survey Over Smog Area, LANCASTER EAGLE-GAZETTE, Nov. 2, 1948, at 1; Doctor 
Calls Fatal Smog Paralyzing, THE COURIER-JOURNAL, Nov. 2, 1948, at 11; Donora Appeals 
To Federal Health Bureau for Aid, THE DAILY CLINTONIAN, Nov. 2, 1948, at 1; Donora Asks 
U.S. To Probe Plague, THE PITTSBURGH PRESS, Nov. 2, 1948, at 1; Traces of Poison Gas 
Found in Smog By State Prober of Donora Death Wave, DEMOCRAT AND CHRONICLE, Nov. 
2, 1948, at 3. On Frank Burke’s background, see Wildcat Strike Shuts J&L Mill, 8500 Men 
Idle, THE PITTSBURGH PRESS, Feb. 22, 1945, at 1; CIO Steelworkers of America Will Meet 
in New Castle Aug. 7-8, THE NEWS-HERALD, Jul. 31, 1948, at 2. 
84.  PHS’s investigatory portfolio can be traced through its annual reports to 
Congress, submitted by the Surgeon General pursuant to PHS authorizing legislation 
between 1902 and 1952 – as can its combined scientific, causal investigatory, pollution 
control, and industry oversight missions. For the division’s activities in 1948, see also 
Statement of Dr. Leonard A. Scheele, Surgeon General, in Hearings before the House 
Appropriations Committee, Department of Labor, Federal Security Agency Appropriations 
for 1951, at 267-68 (1950). On the initial responses to Donora’s request to PHS, see Clean-
Up of Air in Industrial Areas Suggested, Health Service Aid to Donora Delayed by Election 
Day, THE TOWN TALK, Nov. 3, 1948, at 9. On the further delay, see Hope for Federal Probe 
Of Fatal Smog Stymied, THE MERCURY, Nov. 3, 1948, at 13. 
85.  Edwin F. Brennan, Zinc Plant Is Absolved In Deaths, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, Nov. 5, 1948, at 1; No Incriminating Evidence on Any One Donora Mill, ST. 






monitoring stations in the valley to study the air, in the event that the fatal 
circumstances repeated themselves after the zinc plant reopened. Over the 
following weeks, PHS staff began arriving in Donora. 86 The town, then, 
had gotten what it asked for – but under conditions that did not specifically 
commit PHS to a health investigation of the industrial facility’s emissions.  
The investigation took nearly a year,87 and PHS submitted its report 
in mid-October 1949.88 As had been presaged in its early comments and 
study design, its work focused almost entirely on meteorological and 
topographical contributors to the deadly incident and did not attempt to 
trace the deaths to the town’s major industrial facility. The report concluded 
that the “Donora Smog episode of October 25–31, 1948, was an extreme 
case of the ‘smoky morning’ type,” i.e., a typical temperature inversion that 
had trapped the town’s typical smog in the local valley, just to a greater 
than normal degree.89 The report did recommend that the town reduce local 
air pollutants but focused much more on a proposed weather monitoring 
network to forecast future dangerous inversions in time to warn the public. 
 
86.  Steelworkers Give $10,000 to ’Prove Donora Death Smog, THE MORNING 
HERALD, Nov. 6, 1948, at 14; Donora, Pa., Becomes Laboratory To Avert Further Fatal 
Smogs, THE ST. LOUIS STAR AND TIMES, Nov. 5, 1948, at 2; Air Pollution Probe, THE 
PITTSBURGH PRESS, Nov. 20, 1948, at 8; Check on Smog Is Ordered, AMARILLO DAILY 
NEWS, Nov. 5, 1948, at 15. On the growing PHS involvement, see Air Pollution Probe, supra 
note 86; Donora’s Deaths Studied Again, THE INDIANA GAZETTE, Nov. 20, 1948, at 12; U.S. 
To Probe Smog Deaths At Donora, THE PLAIN SPEAKER, Nov. 20, 1948, at 15; Four 
Inquiries Hunt Source of Donora Deaths, THE PITTSBURGH PRESS, Nov. 21, 1948, at 2; The 
“Federals” Move In, THE PITTSBURGH PRESS, Nov. 21, 1948, at 18; Donora Death Probers 
Meet, THE PITTSBURGH PRESS, Nov. 23, 1948, at 9; House-to-House Smog Survey To Start 
Early Next Week in Donora, THE DAILY REPUBLICAN, Nov. 24, 1948, at 1; U.S. Study of Air 
at Donora, Pa., to Start Next Week, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 26, 1948, at 3; May 
Take Year In Donora Probe, REPUBLICAN AND HERALD, Dec. 1, 1948, at 2; Staff Of U.S. 
Public Health Service Specialists Open Donora Smog Probe, THE DAILY REPUBLICAN, Dec. 
1, 1948, at 1; Federal Probers Arrive in Donora, THE PITTSBURGH PRESS, Dec. 3, 1948, at 
2. For PHS’s description of how it became involved, see PHS, Annual Report of the Federal 
Security Agency 1949: Public Health Service, 109–10 (1949). The internal and cross-agency 
discussions that resulted in both the State of Pennsylvania and PHS agreeing that PHS 
should come to Donora have not been studied. 
87.  Donorans To Get Preliminary Report On Smog Probe Tomorrow, THE DAILY 
REPUBLICAN, Feb. 8, 1949, at 1; Donora Report Due Tuesday, THE PITTSBURGH PRESS, Apr. 
22, 1949, at 30; PHS Field Group Back in Donora, THE DAILY REPUBLICAN, Sep. 20, 1949, 
at 1; U.S. Renews Probe of Fatal Donora Smog, LANCASTER NEW ERA, Sep. 22, 1949, at 26; 
Paul F. Ellis, Blanket of Death at Donora Described by Health Service, THE CAPITAL 
JOURNAL, Oct. 18, 1949, at 19. 
88.  H.H. SCHRENK ET AL., AIR POLLUTION IN DONORA, PA: EPIDEMIOLOGY OF THE 
UNUSUAL SMOG EPISODE OF OCT. 1948 (1949). 






If Donora’s residents had been holding out hope for causal findings to 
support lawsuits against U.S. Steel, they were disappointed.90 
PHS, however, had just gained a great deal of public exposure in the 
air pollution space and, perhaps, an opportunity for more. And above all 
else, the PHS report recommended further research:  
Our first step now, of course, is immediate basic research. We 
need to investigate for instance, what long range effect 
continued low concentrations of polluted air has on the health of 
individuals . . . . When we find the answers to all of these 
unknowns, we can proceed to the problem of eliminating the 
causes.91  
This was not a model statement of the precautionary principle, and it 
was not necessarily the case that it was necessary to answer all medical 
research questions before turning to the task of eliminating pollution’s 
causes. But that was what PHS proposed to do. 
B. 1949-1958: EARLY DEBATE ON THE FEDERAL ROLE 
Following Donora, at least twenty-five other cities requested that PHS 
investigate air pollution within their borders. For several years, PHS 
conducted what research it could under whatever authorities and budget 
authorizations it could muster, while interested members in Congress 
sought to expand PHS’s budget authorization with a specific air pollution 
research program, under the watchful and often skeptical review of fiscal 
conservatives concerned with federal budget growth, and anti-statist 
conservatives concerned with federal government growth generally. 
During this time, no distinction was made between PHS “research,” 
“surveys,” or “investigations,” and the work often had political 
implications that could not be avoided. 
Without a specific Congressional authorization, PHS pursued air 
pollution in at least three ways in the latter years of the Truman 
administration. First, it advised states on technical matters under its state 
services authority. Second, it began to study air quality conditions in the 
Detroit-Windsor area at the behest of the International Joint Commission, 
a U.S.-Canadian international border commission with clear federal 
jurisdiction. Third, under its water pollution authorities, PHS had received 
funding to construct a sanitary engineering center in Cincinnati, Ohio, 
which was intended to house its water pollution research activities – and it 
consolidated its air pollution research work there as well. Congressional 
 
90.   Id. at 164. For a critique of its failure to assign any responsibility to the sources 
of the pollutants, see Snyder, supra note 82. The internal politics of the report have not been 
studied. 
91.   Foreword by Leonard A. Scheele, Surgeon General, SCHRENK ET AL., supra note 
88, at iii (emphasis added). To date, no research has been done on how PHS viewed 






budget overseers inquired into these activities in 1950, 1951, and 1952, and 
were most concerned that Canada pay its fair share of the costs for the 
international investigation.92 
The first legislative proposals came in the same week that the PHS’s 
Donora report was released. Two Congressmen from the Donora area 
submitted identical bills stating that the PHS study had “revealed for the 
first time that smog . . . can cause serious acute disabling diseases . . .” and 
proposing to direct $750,000 ($8 million today) to PHS to “conduct 
research into the health hazards of air pollution and to determine the long-
range and chronic, as well as the acute, effects of air pollution, and also to 
establish specific engineering preventive and control measures for 
eliminating the dangers of air contamination.”93 In other words, the 
proposals framed PHS’s mission as medical research into the basic causes 
 
92.   Regular reports on PHS air pollution activities were provided to Congress by the 
Federal Security Agency until the FSA was transformed into HEW. See ANNUAL REPORT 
OF THE FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY 1949: PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE at 109–110 (1949); 
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY 1950: PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE at 56 
(1950); ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY 1951: PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 
at 44 (1951); ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY 1952: PUBLIC HEALTH 
SERVICE at 51 (1952). For Congressional (often rather skeptical) inquiry into PHS budget 
requests for air pollution work, see Department of State Appropriations for 1951: Hearings 
before the House Appropriations Committee, at 980–84 (1950); Departments of State, 
Justice, Commerce and the Judiciary Appropriations for 1951: Hearings before the Senate 
Appropriations Committee, at 848–52 (Apr. 12, 1950); Departments of State, Justice, 
Commerce and the Judiciary Appropriations for 1951: Hearings before the Senate 
Appropriations Committee, at 848–51 (Apr. 12, 1950); Department of Labor – Federal 
Security Agency Appropriations for 1952: Hearings before the House Appropriations 
Committee, at 582 (Feb. 23, 1951); Department of State Appropriations for 1952: Hearings 
before the House Appropriations Committee, at 529-30 (Mar. 6, 1951); Labor – Federal 
Security Appropriations for 1952: Hearings before the Senate Appropriations Committee, 
at 650 (Apr. 25, 1951); Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, and the Judiciary 
Appropriations for 1952: Hearings before the Senate Appropriations Committee, at 1537–
38 (1951). The Cincinnati center was authorized by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
of 1948, § 8(c), Pub. L. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155, 1159 (1948). Its construction was explained 
in detail in Independent Offices Appropriations for 1951: Hearings before the House 
Appropriations Committee, at 2246-51 (Feb. 27, 1950) (statement of Rep. Charles H. 
Elston); and its use for air pollution at Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and 
Welfare Appropriations for 1955: Hearings before the House Appropriations Committee, 
168–69 (Apr. 2, 1954). 
93.   H.R.J. Res. 379, 81st Cong. (Eberharter, D-PA) (Oct. 14, 1949) (to provide for 
research into the health hazards of air pollution); H.R.J. Res. 380, 81st Cong. (Kelley, D-
PA) (Oct. 14, 1949) (same), ref’d to House Commerce Committee 95 CONG. REC. 14,630 
(1949). Bailey speculates that these legislators were engaging in “symbolic politics” and 
submitted these bills primarily to satisfy constituents and claim credit, a cynical 
interpretation based on the (true) fact that they did not resubmit their bills in the following 
Congresses. BAILEY, supra note 4, at 89. Other explanations, however, are also consistent 
with this evidence. Further research into who wrote the bills, how PHS was involved, and 
why the Congressmen submitted the bills would be useful, as would a review of why the 






of disease. However, the bills also proposed to expand PHS’s research into 
technological research and development traditionally dominated by smoke 
abatement engineers and outside the expertise of the PHS staff then 
working on air pollution. The bills did not escape committee in 1949. 
Whatever the reason for failure in 1949, the idea for a federally funded 
air pollution research program returned in 1950 and 1951, with tensions 
unresolved between PHS’s possible investigatory, basic research, and 
abatement missions. The first 1950 proposal was identical to those 
submitted in 1949, but now promoted by Staten Island representative James 
J. Murphy, who appears to have been squarely focused on PHS’s 
investigatory role, as he expressed frustration that his constituents could not 
secure a local PHS inquiry into air pollution coming from New Jersey.94 
Later in the year, a different proposal came from Rep. Helen Gahagan 
Douglas (D-CA), who at the time was engaged in a fierce Senate campaign 
against then-Representative Richard M. Nixon (R-CA) in a state that was 
increasingly concerned about air pollution. Rep. Douglas appears to have 
been focused on nationalizing some of the costs of California’s ongoing air 
pollution research, and her remarks defended federal involvement in the 
field in part by arguing that basic research was expensive for one state alone 
to undertake and would have widespread national benefit.95 While 
Murphy’s proposal repeated the combined medical and technological 
research goals contained in the prior year’s bills, Douglas’s bill innovated 
by splitting the research work between the Bureau of Mines, which would 
investigate prevention and control technologies, and PHS, which was to 
conduct a three-year investigation into health effects – leaving states like 
California with the existing responsibility to develop and run regulatory 
programs. Again, however, these proposals did not escape committee and 
so died permanently at the end of the 81st Congress in 1950.  
 
94.   H.R.J. Res. 416, 81st Cong. (Murphy, D-NY) (Feb. 8, 1950), ref’d to H. 
Commerce Comm. 96 CONG. REC. 1696 (1950), with introductory remarks at 96 CONG. REC. 
3486 (1950), and related extended remarks at 96 CONG. REC. A2006 (1950). 
95.   H.R. 9379, 81st Cong. (Douglas, D-CA) (1950), ref’d to H. Commerce Comm. 
96 CONG. REC. 12,143 (1950), with related extended remarks at 96 CONG. REC. A5733 (Jul. 
10, 1953). Again, Bailey ascribes cynical motive to Rep. Douglas, who he claims without 
evidence was “[p]rompted by the need to find a popular issue to boost her flagging campaign 
against Richard Nixon for a vacant U.S. Senate seat.” Bailey, supra note 4, at 91. Again, 
this motive is possible, and it is probably fair to assume that all of Rep. Douglas’s legislative 
activity in mid-1950 was conducted with some attention to their impact on her Senate 
campaign, but the timing was just as likely to have been due to the recent completion of the 
national smog conference referenced in Rep. Douglas’s introductory remarks. It is not clear 
that either party considered Douglas’s campaign to be “flagging” at the time. Again, answers 
on motive require the archives. For further information on the (in)famous Nixon-Douglas 
battle, GREG MITCHELL, TRICKY DICK AND THE PINK LADY: RICHARD NIXON VS. HELEN 
GAHAGAN DOUGLAS - SEXUAL POLITICS AND THE RED SCARE, 1950 (1998). Given the central 
role that accusations of communism played in the campaign, it is notable that Nixon’s 






In 1951, at the beginning of the 82nd Congress, Rep. Murphy re-
submitted his prior bill, and two months later submitted a new proposal that 
incorporated the joint PHS-Bureau of Mines research structure originally 
proposed by Rep. Douglas. For the first time, this legislative effort was also 
coordinated with a partner in the Senate: Sen. James E. Murray (D-MT), a 
“liberal stalwart” and chair of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare 
Committee, who submitted the Senate counterpart to his own committee. 
Although no action was taken on any of these bills in 1951, they carried 
forward automatically into the next year’s Congressional session, where 
they would ultimately see a debate and vote.96  
The first Congressional votes on the matter of air pollution research – 
and the first public opposition to a federal air pollution program by 
conservative legislators – came in summer 1952, in the last week of 
business of the 82nd Congress. The House Commerce Committee reported 
out Rep. Murphy’s bill, and final passage was intended to have been 
secured under unanimous consent agreements by which the House and 
Senate’s remaining legislative business were to be disposed. However, 
Congressional rules permitted any single legislator to object and thereby 
block any bill. Murphy’s bill permitted the appropriation of “such sums . . . 
as may be necessary” for five years of intensified research by PHS and the 
Bureau of Mines, and this was challenged by House Minority Leader 
Joseph W. Martin, Jr. (R-MA), who asked: “How much will it cost?” House 
Commerce Chair Rep. Arthur G. Klein (D-NY) promptly answered, “about 
$75,000 or $100,000 a year for five years.”97 Evidently satisfied, Rep. 
Martin then asked if the committee report recommending the bill was 
unanimous (it was) and let the matter rest, and the bill passed the House on 
unanimous consent. It then went to the Senate for a vote in similar fashion. 
Two Republican Senators, moderately conservative Sen. Andrew F. 
Schoeppel (R-KS) and highly conservative Sen. Herman Welker (R-ID) 
raised their own concerns about the potential cost of the bill’s unlimited 
 
96.   The 1951 bills were H.R.J. Res 38, 82d Cong. (Murphy, D-NY) (Jan. 3, 1951) 
($500,000 appropriation), ref’d House Commerce Comm. 97 CONG. REC. 34 (1951); H.R.J. 
Res. 218, 82d Cong. (Murphy, D-NY) (Mar. 22, 1951) (unlimited appropriation and 
instruction to report), ref’d House Commerce Comm. 97 CONG. REC. 2897–98 (1951); and 
S.J. Res. 110, 82d Cong. (Murray, D-MT) (1951) (copy of H.R.J. Res. 218), ref’d Senate 
Labor and Public Welfare Comm. 97 CONG. REC. 12,492 (1951), with introductory remarks 
97 CONG. REC. 12,495 (1951). On James E. Murray, see Senator James Murray Dies in 
Butte, GREAT FALLS TRIBUNE, Mar. 24, 1961, at 1. 
97.   The bill was Rep. Murphy’s H.R.J. Res. 218, submitted in 1951, reported 
favorably from the House Commerce Committee in H.R. REP. No. 2359 (Jun. 30, 1952). 
The colloquy with Rep. Martin is at 98 CONG. REC. 8940 (1952). Although Rep. Martin 
would later support federal water pollution control legislation and spending, and even voted 
to override Eisenhower’s cost-based veto of the water pollution bill in 1960, he was at the 
time a consistent fiscal conservative. See JAMES JOSEPH KENNEALLY, A COMPASSIONATE 
CONSERVATIVE: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF JOSEPH W. MARTIN, JR., SPEAKER OF THE U.S. 






appropriation. Unlike Rep. Klein, however, Sen. Murray was unable to 
immediately provide a specific annual cost estimate, and Welker – who 
would become famous for his vigorous defense of Joseph McCarthy in 
1954 – objected to the bill on those grounds, killing it for the year.98 Welker, 
then, became the first conservative legislator in U.S. history to vote against 
federal air pollution legislation. 
The end of 1952 marked the end of the Truman administration, and, 
as it turned out, of the Democratic majorities in Congress. The November 
1952 election brought in moderate Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower and 
a Republican-controlled House and Senate for the 83rd Congress. PHS 
continued to investigate air pollution without a formal mandate, and 
Representatives continued to re-submit bills. But the legislative 
environment was now very different, with a new and much more fiscally 
conservative party now in leadership. This newly empowered conservatism 
immediately expressed itself in a renewed interest in balancing the federal 
budget, and the PHS budget was not spared. This led to a 1953 debate over 
the PHS budget line for “engineering, sanitation, and industrial hygiene,” 
which the Republican-controlled House Appropriations committee had cut 
by about 25 percent, from about $4,000,000 to a flat $3,000,000, below 
even what the Eisenhower administration had requested.99 Representatives 
from California and Ohio pointed out that this was the water and air 
pollution research budget, which they cared a great deal about, and sought 
to increase it again. The vocal opposition to any increases was centralized 
in the midwestern industrial states represented by old guard conservatives 
– outspoken anti-communist and budget hawk Rep. Fred E. Busbey (R-IL) 
spoke against the amendment, and the entire discussion was preceded by 
what can only be described as a highly sarcastic speech from staunch 
 
98.   For the Senate action on H.R.J. Res. 218, see Senate Report No. 2079 (Jul. 3, 
1952); see also 98 CONG. REC. 9314–15 (1952). Sen. Schoeppel was not a renowned 
conservative but supported Robert Taft against Dwight Eisenhower in the 1952 Republican 
presidential primary. Sen. Welker, on the other hand, although he served only one Senate 
term, made a name for himself as a vigorous anti-Communist and member of the farthest 
right wing of the Republican Party. Ex-Senator Welker Dies At Age Of 51, DAILY PRESS, 
Oct. 31, 1957, at 37. 
99.   For fiscal review of PHS programs in 1953 and 1954, see THE BUDGET OF THE 
U.S. GOVERNMENT 1953, at 1185 (1952); Department of Labor – Federal Security Agency 
Appropriations for 1954: Hearings before the House Appropriations Comm., 83rd Cong. 
720 (1953); Labor – Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriations for 1954: Hearings 
before the Senate Appropriations Comm., 83rd Cong. 1218–19 (1953); Departments of 
State, Justice, and Commerce Appropriations for 1954: Hearings before the Senate 
Appropriations Comm., 83rd Cong. 1330, 1336 (1953); Departments of State, Justice, and 
Commerce Appropriations for 1954: Hearings before the House Appropriations Comm., 






conservative Rep. Clare Hoffman (R-MI).100 At the end of the debate, the 
fiscal conservatives won out, and the PHS pollution research budget 
remained cut along with everything else in 1953. 
One final bill failed to leave committee in 1953, and became central 
to events in 1954: a pro-business alternative from the chairman of 
California’s Republican House delegation, Rep. Carl Hinshaw, which 
provided for accelerated amortization under the federal tax code for the 
costs of air pollution control devices installed by industry, creating a 
financial incentive to install them.101 This idea was taken up by California’s 
moderate Republican Senator, Thomas Kuchel (pronounced “Keekel”), 
who became a strong advocate on the air pollution issue in the Senate in 
1954. Rather than attempt to submit a standalone bill to a committee he did 
not control, Kuchel recruited Indiana Republican Sen. Homer Capehart to 
introduce an air pollution amendment into the pending federal housing act, 
which was then being handled by the Senate Banking and Finance 
Committee, which Capehart chaired. Kuchel’s amendment included three 
major proposals: the accelerated tax amortization and associated unknown 
tax expense that had first been introduced by Rep. Hinshaw; plus $5 million 
for ongoing research by PHS consistent with prior efforts to secure that 
funding; and finally $50 million for government loans to support businesses 
installing pollution control equipment.102 Following a series of short 
hearings on the amendment (during which no dissent was invited or 
registered), the Senate committee reported out a bill that included the air 
pollution program and many other changes to the House bill, which was 
subsequently debated and passed with amendments by the Senate and 
returned to the House for conference. The Senate, in other words, had just 
unanimously passed a housing bill that included an expensive, but business-
oriented, air pollution control program.103 By mid-July, however, the 
 
100.  99 CONG. REC. 5493–95 (1953). On Busbey’s politics, see Edward Wilson, 
Busbey Fight in 3d Based on Americanism, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Mar. 3, 1946, at 26. On 
Hoffman, see Michigan’s Clare Hoffman Dies at 92, THE TERRE HAUTE TRIBUNE, Nov. 5, 
1967, at 16. 
101.  H.R. 2720, 82d Cong. (Hinshaw, R-CA) (Feb. 6, 1953) (accelerated amortization 
for tax purposes on business costs for installation of pollution control equipment), ref’d 
House Ways and Means Comm., 83 CONG. REC. 951 (1953). 
102.  S. 3115 (Kuchel, R-CA) (Mar. 11, 1954), introduced with remarks and referred 
to Senate Finance Committee, 100 CONG. REC. 3060 (1954), and S. 2938 (Capehart R-IN & 
Kuchel, R-CA, Apr. 1, 1954), introduced 100 CONG. REC. 4312 (1954). Research is still 
needed on how Kuchel convinced Capehart to undertake this effort. Bailey states that the 
two Senators were “[f]rustrated at the prospect of air pollution control bills disappearing 
without trace in unsympathetic committees,” but without citation. BAILEY, supra note 4, at 
94. 
103.  On the House bill prior to the Senate amendment, see 83 CONG. REC. 4430–91 







conference had removed the air pollution program from the bill, because 
the House conferees (four Republicans and three Southern Democrats) 
flatly refused to incorporate it. With the air pollution program removed, the 
housing bill was taken up in the House, passed, and sent back to the Senate 
where it was also passed. In November, Sen. Kuchel could only lament that 
the House had blocked his air pollution program. By way of commentary 
he submitted a news report on a meeting of the National Association of 
Real Estate Boards (“NAREB”), active lobbyists on the housing bill) that 
had been interrupted by a terrible smog event, but had, notwithstanding its 
suffering, passed resolutions urging that all functions of the federal 
government that could be conducted by the states, should be conducted by 
the states. Thus, 1954, and the 83rd Congress, ended without an air 
pollution bill.104 
The November 1954 midterm elections saw the return of Democratic 
majorities to the House and Senate, and Congressional power on air 
pollution shift back to the House Health and Safety Committee. Rather than 
work with the House, Sens. Kuchel and Capehart wrote a letter to President 
Eisenhower proposing a study committee to consider federal air pollution 
programs.105 The administration agreed and convened the Ad Hoc 
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Interdepartmental Committee on Community Air Pollution with 
representatives from multiple interested agencies. The Committee’s final 
report was titled “The Federal Role in the Community Air Pollution 
Problem,” and as its title indicated it was formulated carefully to counter 
conservative objections to the federal government’s entry into a new field. 
It defined its proposed program carefully to maintain supremacy of the 
states and recommended that federal support be limited to research in order 
to avoid impinging on state prerogatives – a cautious “middle way” 
approach. The Eisenhower administration separately indicated its support 
for such a program through two policy statements in early 1955.106 The 84th 
Congress, then, began with an unprecedented spate of air pollution bill 
submissions, led primarily by moderate Republicans.107 
The bill that would get legislative attention was submitted by Sens. 
Martin (R-PA), Capehart (R-IN), Knowland (R-CA), Kuchel (R-CA), 
Potter (R-MI), and Wiley (R-WI) in February 1954. HEW and PHS 
supported it and Senator Kuchel introduced it, reassuring everyone that “it 
is not the thought that Congress has anything to do with control of air 
pollution through the proposed legislation or through any contemplated 
Federal legislation. That problem remains where it ought to remain – in the 
States of the Union, and in the cities and the counties of our country.” The 
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(Williams, D-NJ) (Jan. 24, 1955); H. Res. 116, 84th Cong. (Dollinger, D-NY) (Jan. 26, 
1955); H.R. 3547, 84th Cong. (Byrnes, R-WI) (Feb. 3, 1955); H.R. 3548, 84th Cong. 
(Abbitt, D-VA) (Feb. 3, 1955); H.R. 3549, 84th Cong. (Bentley, R-MI) (Feb. 3, 1955); H.R. 
3551, 84th Cong. (Hinshaw, R-CA) (Feb. 3, 1955); H.R. 3552, 84th Cong. (Jackson, R-CA) 
(Feb. 3, 1955); H.R. 3553, 84th Cong. (Lipscomb, R-CA) (Feb. 3, 1955); H.R. 3555, 84th 
Cong. (Ray, R-NY) (Feb. 3, 1955); S. 917, 84th Cong. (multiple sponsors) (Feb. 4, 1955); 
S. 928, 84th Cong. (multiple sponsors) (Feb. 4, 1955), rep’d Senate Rep. 389 (May 27, 
1950); H.R. 3680, 84th Cong. (McDonough, R-CA) (Feb. 7, 1955); H.R. 3901, 84th Cong. 
(Hiestand, R-CA) ( Feb. 10, 1955); H.R. 3906, 84th Cong. (Laird, R-WI) (Feb. 10, 1955); 
H.R. 4313, 84th Cong. (Miller, R-NY) (Feb. 23, 1955); H.R. 4741, 84th Cong. (Nelson, R-
ME) (Mar. 8, 1955); S. 1565, 84th Cong. (Capehart, R-IN) (Mar. 28, 1955); H.R.J. Res. 
259, 84th Cong. (Hess, R-OH) (Mar. 23, 1955); S. 2126, 84th Cong., rep’d directly in Rep. 
No. 404 (June 1, 1955); H.R. 6597, 84th Cong. (Hiestand, R-CA) (June 1, 1955); H.R. 6699, 
84th Cong. (Roosevelt, D-CA) (June 7, 1955). Although this was a diverse group of 







bill passed by unanimous consent.108 The same point was reiterated in the 
House, and once again in the Senate while approving several house 
amendments: the bill would not create a federal air pollution control 
program.109 Rather, the bill proposed a research program, eventually set at 
$5 million per year for five years. It passed and was called, quite 
misleadingly, the Air Pollution Control Act of 1955.110 PHS’s role had been 
decided: it would support the states and coordinate research, with a five 
year authorization to review spending, consistent with conservative 
principles of federalism and fiscal responsibility. It would not enter the 
business of technology development or, especially, enforcement. Tax relief 
programs for business were not included. 
The years between 1955 and 1958 saw the House Health and Safety 
Subcommittee begin to take on traffic safety matters, and it was in this 
context that Rep. Paul Schenck (R-OH) first began to agitate for the 
Surgeon General to set emissions standards for automobiles – an effort that 
failed and was converted into another research bill in 1960. Under the 1955 
Act, researchers associated with or funded by the PHS air pollution 
program would produce almost a thousand research publications on a vast 
range of fundamental problems in air pollution control, many of which 
would be absolutely essential to justifying regulatory limits in the future.111 
But in the meantime, many U.S. cities remained choked by smog. The 1955 
Act’s limited-federal, research-oriented approach was the new standard for 
federal involvement, but it did not force any action. 
C. 1958-1960: THE FLEMMING PROPOSAL 
Arthur S. Flemming deserves credit as the first person to actively 
promote giving the federal government independent authority to fight air 
pollution, in addition to researching it. As a member of Eisenhower’s 
cabinet, he might have been an unlikely advocate. But Flemming was, 
above all else, interested in the discipline of good government – he was the 
former director of American University’s School of Public Affairs, had 
served on the Hoover Commission on government organization, and had 
run the Office of Defense Mobilization from 1952 until Eisenhower needed 
a new HEW Secretary and tapped him for the role in August 1958.112 
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Among his early duties as Secretary was to assist with a national smog 
conference that had already been scheduled.113 It is not clear exactly how 
the idea came to him – at the conference he said only that the role of the 
federal government was foremost on his mind.114 But at a press conference 
a few days later, it was reported that “Flemming said that he personally 
favored strengthening the Air Pollution Act by authorizing government to 
hold hearings and make findings and recommendations, particularly on 
interstate pollution problems.”115 This was the first statement in support of 
what would eventually become the new federal authority of the 1963 Clean 
Air Act. 
What Flemming meant requires some explanation. His idea was to 
translate a similar authority granted to PHS under the existing version of 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) – specifically 
FWPCA’s most recent revisions in 1956 – to the air pollution context. 
FWPCA 1956 had authorized PHS to unilaterally initiate “conferences” 
whenever PHS determined that water pollution was threatening public 
health, and that the states involved were not doing enough to solve the 
problem. It also empowered PHS, for the first time, to use the conference 
findings as the basis for water pollution abatement actions in federal court 
if the situation did not improve. Flemming had his staff prepare draft 
legislation along these lines for air pollution, and the resulting proposal’s 
thresholds for federal jurisdiction, its administrative processes, and the use 
of its findings all began as borrowings from FWPCA, condensed and 
modified but nonetheless recognizable. The critical difference was that 
Flemming’s air pollution proposal only authorized federally-initiated 
hearings as an information-generating endeavor to create nonbinding 
recommendations – unlike FWPCA, it did not include a federal abatement 
or enforcement mechanism based on the outcome of the hearings.116 
Throughout the rest of this Article, this idea – the power to force a hearing 
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on air pollution problems but without independent authority to abate the 
pollution after the hearing – is referred to as “the Flemming proposal.” 
Flemming had his idea translated into legislation in 1959, and 
requested and secured approval from the Eisenhower administration to 
push the idea forward after that. In January 1960, President Eisenhower’s 
Annual Budget Message indicated that HEW was writing “legislative 
recommendations to . . . authorize greater Federal leadership in combating 
air pollution.”117 In February, HEW staff transmitted a proposed bill to 
Congress, with a request to consider it. Rep. Roberts, chair of the House 
Health and Safety Subcommittee, submitted the bill – the first to contain 
language that would eventually be incorporated into the Clean Air Act of 
1963.118 Sen. Kuchel submitted it to the Senate, whence it also eventually 
made its way to Roberts’ committee.119 
It is likely that Flemming developed his proposal over the objections 
of some within PHS’s Air Pollution Division, who expressed concern that 
seeking new and potentially controversial oversight authority would draw 
Congressional scrutiny and threaten PHS’s research budget. It certainly was 
the case that the conference authority was already controversial, and would 
expand the federal role beyond the relatively technical, sedate, and 
(arguably) apolitical project of research development and coordination, into 
the highly charged and very political project of conducting public inquiries 
into state progress on air pollution. As such, it was controversial, and 
hauling state officers before a federal fact-finding tribunal at the discretion 
of the Surgeon General was likely to generate states’ rights opposition.120 
In any event, in 1960 the Flemming bills died in Roberts’ committee. 
The key question was: why? Roberts was a Southern Democrat, signatory 
of the Southern Manifesto, and firmly committed to states’ rights as a 
means to protect segregation in the South, and so one possible explanation 
was that they were inconsistent with his view of the role of government. 
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But Roberts was also sincerely interested in fighting air pollution, and was 
not an anti-statist ideologue. Rather, he appears to have had a strong 
commitment to the legislative process, and particularly to holding public 
hearings. In 1960, Roberts had intended to hold a hearing on the Flemming 
proposal prior to releasing it from committee. His House colleague from 
Birmingham had lobbied Roberts to hold his hearing in the city in summer 
of 1960, and Roberts himself had agreed, but under House rules he was not 
allowed to do so without approval from the chair of the full House 
Commerce Committee, which approval came only in November 1960, after 
the legislative session had already ended. Then, after the Birmingham 
hearing was scheduled and planned for December 1960, it had to be 
postponed after Roberts underwent minor surgery and was advised by his 
doctor not to travel. Thus, the Flemming bill died not because Roberts or 
his committee actively opposed it, but because Roberts was unable to 
incorporate it into a hearing that, for a variety of reasons, he intended to 
hold prior to reporting any air pollution legislation out of his committee.121 
Of course, had the hearing happened, Roberts may have found another 
reason to delay the bill – as the question of expanding federal power was 
still of paramount concern to many of his colleagues in Congress – but there 
is no evidence that he was ideologically opposed to the Flemming proposal 
at this time. 
Nonetheless, given Roberts’ delay on the Flemming proposal, 1960 – 
and the Eisenhower Administration, and the 86th Congress – ended with 
only a brief extension of the 1955 Act’s research program. Air pollution 
would now be a question for the New Frontier. 
D. 1961: THE AMA PROPOSALS 
In November 1960, Democrat John F. Kennedy narrowly defeated 
Republican Richard M. Nixon to win the presidential election. Although 
the balance of power in Congress remained largely as it had been – with 
Southern Democrats largely in control – federal executive leadership 
changed completely with Kennedy in power. Long-time Kennedy ally 
Abraham Ribicoff was offered his choice of cabinet positions and took 
HEW, replacing Flemming. Ivan Nestingen, who had run Kennedy’s 
Wisconsin election campaign, was recruited to lead PHS. Luther Terry was 
appointed Surgeon General. These leaders had very different ideas about 
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the role of the federal government than did their counterparts in the 
Eisenhower administration.122 
As the 1961 legislative session opened, the 87th Congress was 
required to reset the legislative clock. Bills that had died in committee the 
previous year had to be resubmitted if they were to get another chance. This 
happened with the Flemming proposal, which was resubmitted by 
interested legislators from California in January 1961. Rep. Roberts, 
however, introduced only an extension of the 1955 Act that did include the 
Flemming proposal. As usual, all of these were referred to Roberts’ Health 
and Safety Subcommittee. Thus, at the beginning of the 87th Congress, the 
Flemming proposal remained the most advanced thinking on federal air 
pollution authority and was again awaiting some action in the House. But 
time had brought change, and change brought new ideas to bear.123 
i. The Kennedy Administration Weighs In (February, June 1961) 
It is impossible to say how air pollution legislation would have 
developed, had Richard Nixon won the 1960 presidential election and 
carried on, in some fashion, Eisenhower’s moderate Republican 
government. Instead, John F. Kennedy entered with a decade-long backlog 
of reform-minded proposals for federal action to consider. Kennedy had 
promised a domestic program for the “new frontier” of the 1960s, but as he 
entered office it was still largely unclear what that agenda would look like. 
With respect to air pollution, the answer was that the Kennedy 
administration began without any clear goals but set an agenda consistent 
with increased federal activity in the future.124 
John F. Kennedy is not remembered today as a strong proponent of 
environmental causes. His Interior Secretary, Stewart Udall, struggled to 
interest him in conservation issues, although today it is recognized that 
Kennedy’s secret health problems may have prevented him from 
conforming to Udall’s ideals. During his presidential campaign, Kennedy 
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had relied on an advisory committee to develop his natural resources 
policies and appears to have been largely content to defer to that group on 
what to highlight. However, he was better versed in pollution issues than 
he is typically given credit for. During his House and Senate career, 
Kennedy had connected water pollution control with economic wellbeing, 
and he had become a vocal supporter of the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act. On the campaign trail in 1960, he had given several speeches on the 
topic, and criticized Eisenhower’s 1960 veto of FWPCA amendments. 
What he did not have was a legislative agenda for air pollution.125 
On January 23, 1961 – three days after his inauguration – Kennedy 
announced that he would address Congress in an immediate State of the 
Union address and follow that with a series of detailed domestic legislative 
proposals spelled out in a series of “special messages to Congress.”126 
Although seven to ten were initially planned, Kennedy ultimately sent 
twenty-seven such messages between February and September 1961 alone. 
They included major new proposals for federal action, including the Peace 
Corps and what would later become Medicaid. They also included 
statements on public health and natural resources, the two policy areas 
where air pollution matters would naturally have been raised, but the health 
message did not mention air pollution at all, and the natural resources 
program, a reworking of the report of Kennedy’s campaign advisory 
committee, included air pollution only as an afterthought, offering that a 
new PHS unit proposed for developing water pollution control measures 
also “should provide new leadership, research and financial and technical 
assistance for the control of air pollution,” and called very generally for “an 
effective Federal air pollution control program.” In other words, while 
Kennedy and his policy advisors dreamed of a much more robust federal 
role in many aspects of U.S. society, those dreams did not, in 1961, include 
a federal solution to urban air pollution. 127 
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Again, however, the administration clearly did understand pollution 
to be a problem. In early 1960 the water pollution program had been more 
fully developed, had been the subject of campaign speeches, and had seen 
amendments brought farther along legislatively than had the air pollution 
program. Thus, during the summer of 1961, both Kennedy and Congress 
focused on the water program first. In June 1961, Congress passed FWPCA 
amendments that had been under discussion for several years.128 As 
Kennedy noted in his remarks upon signing the bill: “I think this affords a 
more comprehensive and precise definition of the Federal government’s 
role in controlling . . . pollution . . . .”129 With a newly updated water 
pollution statute now available as a model, new opportunities for 
innovation in air pollution presented themselves. 
ii. Hugh Mields’ Contributions (February to November 1961) 
Unlike the Kennedy administration, there was one group with a very 
clear idea of what it wanted to see in new air pollution legislation in 1961: 
the American Municipal Association. As explained in Part I, the AMA was 
one of several influential inter-municipal organizations that had been 
developing in the postwar U.S. as the “urban lobby,” and that promoted a 
greater federal role in solving the common problems of large cities, in the 
face of a great deal of neglect and even opposition by many state 
governments. While their long-term goal was a new federal department 
devoted to urban affairs, these groups shared common interest in resolving 
air pollution, which in its worst forms plagued large cities most of all. 
Hugh Mields, Jr. was the AMA’s legislative director and is the one 
person who could (and did) with some justification claim to be the primary 
author of the Clean Air Act of 1963. According to him, his work on the 
topic arose out of his work for the AMA on urban issues generally, and he 
wrote the first draft of an air pollution bill in early 1961 in consultation (and 
disagreement) with Vernon MacKenzie, the director of the PHS’s Division 
of Air Pollution. The primary conflict between Mields and MacKenzie was 
on the question of whether PHS should have any sort of independent power 
to fight air pollution – with Mields pushing the idea, and MacKenzie, 
“conservative” according to Mields, opposing it. Thus, per Mields, he 
developed two separate legislative proposals on air pollution, one that 
added an independent PHS abatement authority, and one that did not. “The 
first copy that was written did not have enforcement in it, but we wanted 
enforcement. We then developed an enforcement section which paralleled 
 
128.  FWPCA Amendments, Pub. L. 87-88, 75 Stat. 204 (1961) (“FWPCA 1961”). 
129.  JFK, Remarks Upon Signing the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 






water pollution control enforcement,” and attempted to get Congressional 
sponsors to introduce them both so that they could be considered.130 
In Kennedy, the AMA had a friend, and they had good reason to 
expect his administration’s support. Kennedy had spoken repeatedly to 
AMA members during his 1960 presidential campaign and had developed 
a strong position on the problems of conservative federalism as early as 
1957. In a speech to the U.S. Conference of Mayors titled “Our American 
Cities and their Second-Class Citizens,” he had lamented what he saw as 
the anti-urban prejudice in U.S. politics, and had used air pollution as one 
of his examples: “A political leader from Scranton or Providence or Miami 
is deemed incapable of understanding the problems of the farmer or miner, 
although spokesmen from rural and mining areas have no hesitation 
whatsoever in revamping our plans for urban development or smog 
control.”131 He excoriated the state and federal governments’ failures to 
address urban concerns, and placed the blame squarely: “the hard facts of 
the matter are that the apportionment of seats in our Federal and state 
legislatures has been deliberately rigged and juggled in such a manner as to 
deny to the cities and their voters their full and equal voice in those 
legislative bodies.”132 He argued that the only path forward was increased 
federal authority in urban matters: “As long as democracy is distorted in 
this fashion, we can rightfully expect our cities to seek Federal action on 
the urban problems ignored by [their] unsympathetic and unrepresentative 
state legislatures.”133 He developed these themes further in two additional 
speeches in 1957 and 1959, and consistently discussed pollution as an 
important element of the urban situation.134 There was every reason to 
expect that the Kennedy administration would be sympathetic to proposals 
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to use the federal government to address air pollution in cities. This meant 
lobbying. 
a. The “League” Bill (February 1961) 
Hugh Mields submitted his first bill to Ivan Nestingen, the new PHS 
head, in February 1961, where it was received by the office of Wilbur J. 
Cohen, HEW Assistant Secretary in charge of HEW’s legislative division, 
and likely reviewed by Dean W. Coston, who was the HEW legislative 
office expert on water and air pollution. The bill evidently received a 
favorable response.135 
Mields’ draft bill would only be submitted into the legislative record 
in November 1961, by the Alabama League of Municipalities, during the 
hearing in Birmingham held by Rep. Roberts, with no credit to Mields, and 
so is called here the “League” bill, or the “weak” AMA bill because it did 
not include strong enforcement provisions.136 A review of the document 
reveals that Mields had provided an essential service: he had consolidated 
a number of ideas about federal authority over air pollution into a single 
document. A textual analysis, again, however, reveals that these ideas were 
not new – they were, rather, a skilled combination of many pre-existing 
ideas, translated and modified to make sense in the context of air pollution.  
To start with, the “weak” AMA bill copied a policy that had first 
appeared as Eisenhower Executive Order 10779 encouraging federal 
facilities managers to take steps to reduce their pollution; copied 
declarations of policy from the 1955 Act; and incorporated the Flemming 
hearing authority proposal that had been floating around since Flemming 
first had it drafted. Mields’ unique contribution was to import many 
additional provisions from the Federal Water Pollution Control Act into the 
air pollution context. Specifically, the “League” bill borrowed from 
FWPCA: congressional instruction for federal encouragement of state and 
local cooperation on air pollution issues; congressional authorization for 
 
135.  Again, much of this comes from Ripley, but appears to be reporting on written 
correspondence that seems credible. See Ripley, supra note 4, at 239. On Coston’s role in 
the legislative division: Interview by William W. Moss with Wilbur J. Cohen, Assistant 
Sect. of Health, Education, and Welfare (1961-1965), in Ann Arbor, Michigan, at 89 (July 
20, 1972), JFK Archives Digital Identifier # JFKOH-WJC-03 (“Cohen Interview”), 
https://perma.cc/S7Q8-DJNA. On the favorable response: Ripley, supra note 4, at 239 (“In 
replying to [Mield’s] letter [to Nestingen] Wilbur J. Cohen, the assistant secretary of HEW 
for legislation, indicated general agreement with the principles stated by Mields.”). 
136.  The bill language does not appear in the record until November 1961, when it 
was introduced by Ed Reid of the Alabama League of Municipalities as part of the Health 
and Safety Subcommittee in Birmingham. Birmingham Hearing, infra note 148, at 70–75. 
The Alabama League was one of the AMA’s member organizations, and it is possible that 
Mields and Reid coordinated to transmit the bill language to Congress, and specifically to 
Rep. Roberts, with Reid acting as a local intermediary via the hearing that Huddleston and 






interstate compacts and joint agencies to regulate air pollution; 
congressional authorization for PHS to coordinate research, investigations, 
training, and surveys; congressional authorization for PHS to create 
regulations; unlimited appropriations to carry out the bill’s purposes; and 
many FWPCA definitions.137 
The bill appears to have framed the debate around federal air pollution 
control throughout 1961. In particular, it (and Mields’ advocacy on 
enforcement) continued to center the question of whether PHS should have 
the power to do something directly about the air pollution problem, beyond 
providing national research support and technical advising to the states. As 
described below, much of Mields’ language was retained in later bills and 
had an enormous influence on both the structure and substance of the final 
law in 1963. But at this stage it did not contain the item that Mields wanted 
most of all: a federal abatement or enforcement authority equivalent to that 
in the federal water pollution act. Mields needed a Congressmember willing 
to support the notion. 
b. The Halpern Bill (September 1961) 
In September 1961, Rep. Seymore Halpern (R-NY) introduced a bill 
that proposed two major expansions to federal authority over air 
pollution.138 There is reason to believe that the Halpern bill is Mields’ 
second legislative proposal, i.e., the “strong” AMA bill: first, Mields 
reported that he wrote two bills, only one of which contained enforcement 
mechanisms;139 second, the Halpern bill contained aggressive and 
expansive federal enforcement authority;140 third, that authority was based 
on FWPCA in the same way that the earlier AMA bill was;141 and fourth, 
the bill contained no overlap at all with the prior AMA-sponsored 
proposals.142 Thus, it appears probable that this bill was also Mields’ work, 
that Mields reached out to Halpern in his efforts to recruit legislators to 
propose it, and that other legislators, including Rep. Roberts and Sen. 
Kuchel, had all likely refused. 
The Halpern bill’s centerpiece was a procedure for the Surgeon 
General to abate air pollution. The language borrowed extensively from 
FWPCA, and specifically from the 1961 FWPCA amendments that had just 
become law two months earlier. The new administrative process was to be 
called a “conference.”143 If requested by any Governor, state air pollution 
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control agency, or municipality (with the concurrence of the state’s 
governor), or if the Surgeon General had “reason to believe that air 
pollution [from one state] is endangering the health or welfare of persons 
in [another],” the Surgeon General was to convene a conference of the 
upwind and downwind states’ pollution control authorities to develop 
findings on the occurrence of pollution, the “adequacy of measures taken 
toward abatement of the pollution,” and the “nature of delays, if any, being 
encountered in abating the pollution.”144 At any time thereafter, if the 
Surgeon General “believe[d] . . . that effective progress toward abatement 
of such pollution is not being made and that the health or welfare of any 
person is being endangered,” he could make recommendations for 
“necessary remedial action,” and, if satisfactory progress did not occur 
within six months, the HEW Secretary was to call a “public hearing,” with 
a hearing board made of state and federal government representatives. “If 
the hearing board finds such pollution is occurring and effective progress 
toward abatement is not being made it shall make recommendations to [the 
HEW Secretary] the measures, if any, which it finds to be reasonable and 
equitable to secure abatement of such pollution.”145 HEW was then 
authorized to order abatement in accordance with the findings. The 
abatement order would become final sixty days later and was appealable 
only to the federal circuit courts. The law was clear that this process 
“displac[ed]” state, interstate, and local abatement authority under the 
specified circumstances.146  
As discussed below, this language did not gain traction in 1961 or 
1962 but was recruited into legislation introduced in 1963 that others took 
credit for, and survived to become the most important element of the 1963 
Clean Air Act. 
iii. A Hearing in Birmingham (November 1961) 
As the AMA’s bills were circulating, the business of the House Health 
and Safety Subcommittee was to review legislation that had been referred 
to it. For most of 1961, that meant only the 1955 Act extension and the 
Flemming proposal. In September 1961, the Senate Public Works 
Committee reported favorably on the Senate version of these programs, and 
the Senate passed it on a voice vote. Sen. Kuchel reminded his colleagues 
that they had passed an identical bill the year before, and assured his 
conservative brethren that there was “nothing in this bill which would 
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transgress on the jurisdiction, rights, and powers of States and other non-
Federal agencies of government.”147 
In receipt of the bill from the Senate, the House Health and Safety 
Subcommittee did not refer the bill for a vote in the House before the end 
of the legislative session. Rather, Rep. Roberts finally conducted the air 
pollution hearing in Birmingham that he had been planning for the better 
part of a year and a half. As the proceedings began, the business was 
primarily the extension of the research program, and the question of limited 
federal authority to conduct limited hearings. Roberts’ opening statement 
at the Birmingham hearing took a characteristic, conservative stand on 
federal power in the field: “It is generally agreed I think, that the actual 
control of air pollution is a local responsibility. We could not set up and 
enforce an abatement program at long range from Washington.”148 The 
questions he posed to frame the discussion came from a fiscally and 
politically conservative perspective: a federal research program “costs 
money. With the great demands on the Federal Government for tax dollars, 
is [the existing 1955 research] program worthwhile? Should the program 
be continued? Should it be expanded?”149 But he then added, without 
further explanation: “Should the Surgeon General be given additional 
authority?”150 When he mentioned the pending legislation before the 
committee, he highlighted his own bill as an extension-only bill, and 
credited the extension proposal to the Senate (S. 455), without mentioning 
that S. 455 was a copy of his own bill.151 He thereby distanced himself 
personally from the Flemming proposal, while also providing it a public 
view. 
The Birmingham hearing, however, turned out to be a small affair. 
The speakers were largely local and friendly. The federal testimony 
reported on existing programs but was vague on future plans and silent on 
the details of new legislation. The hearing did not draw out any opposition. 
It was not, in other words, the main show. It did, however, relieve Roberts 
of his prior commitment to bring his subcommittee to Birmingham, and set 
the stage for further discussion in Washington.152 
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E. 1962: WASHINGTON HAPPENS 
1962 was supposed to be the year that Congress passed a major new 
air pollution bill. The legislative session did not require resubmission of 
pending bills, and S. 455, incorporating the Flemming proposal, had 
already passed the Senate. The Kennedy Administration wanted it to 
become law and was now also supportive of many other elements of the 
“weak” AMA proposal. What remained was for staff to develop a 
consensus draft that incorporated the agreeable elements from these sources 
into a single bill, and for the House to hold hearings and pass it.  
i. The Administration Position (February 1962) 
The progress that had been made on thinking about environmental 
health within the Kennedy administration over the last year was clear in 
Kennedy’s second annual health policy statement, issued on February 27, 
1962, which contained an entire section on “a healthy environment.” Four 
months before The New Yorker began serializing Rachel Carson’s Silent 
Spring, Kennedy argued: “There is an increasing gap in our knowledge of 
the impact upon our health of the many new chemical compounds and 
physical and biological factors introduced daily into our environment. 
Every year 400 to 500 new chemicals come into use. Many of them will 
improve the public health. Others, regardless of every safeguard, present 
potential hazards.”153 To remedy this, Kennedy endorsed an air pollution 
bill containing the Flemming proposal: 
I recommend that the Congress enact legislation to provide: (a) 
authority for an adequate research program on the causes, 
effects, and control of air pollution, (b) project grants and 
technical assistance to State and local air pollution control 
agencies to assist in the development and initiation or 
improvement of programs to safeguard the quality of air, and (c) 
authority to conduct studies and hold public conferences 
concerning any air pollution problem of interstate nature or of 
significance to communities in different parts of the Nation. 
Legislation along these lines has already passed the Senate, and 
I urge final favorable action in this Congress.154 
Thereafter, in weekly legislative updates on “Legislative Items 
Recommended by the President,” the White House tracked the progress of 
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the air pollution bill as a “minor proposal for 1962,” among about fifty other 
priorities for the administration that session.155 
ii. Urban Affairs (February 1962) 
A consensus air pollution bill was thus in the works and would address 
a significant urban affairs problem. But before that, the Kennedy 
administration attempted something even bigger for his city supporters: 
Kennedy issued reorganization plans that would have created the 
Department of Urban Affairs and Housing, elevating existing federal 
functions in these areas to a cabinet-level department.156 The effort was 
modeled on Eisenhower’s successful work to elevate the FSA to HEW, but 
the outcome was very different. After a battle in the House, Kennedy’s 
proposals were rejected. For the purposes of this Article, the debacle – and 
at the time it was a debacle – is relevant for two reasons: first, because the 
proponents of an urban affairs department consistently pointed to air 
pollution, among many other problems, as the kind of issue that cities 
needed federal assistance for, and, second, because it added air pollution to 
the anti-statist conservative target list for the first time.157 
This targeting occurred in conservative periodicals and newspapers 
and was transmitted to Congress via conservative members. In 
“Washington Reaches for Your City Hall,” Nation’s Business, published 
by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, cited air pollution among the many 
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unnecessary federal programs that a Department of Urban Affairs would 
promote.158 In “Goal for the United States: Planned Economy, Kennedy 
Style,” U.S. News & World Report directly associated urban pollution 
control with planned-economy communism.159 The latter article was 
submitted to Congress with some characteristic criticism from a 
conservative Texan: “This Congress faces a tremendous challenge in 
saving the American way of life in face of the pressures by the 
administration to experiment with total planning and total controls. I hope 
we have the courage to resist this attack on our free competitive 
system . . . .”160 In similar vein, a Wyoming newspaper said of Kennedy’s 
proposed public health programs: when the federal government “implies 
that we are neither responsible or able as citizens to solve air pollution 
problems, environmental health problems, research problems and child 
health problems in no other way than through Federal means, then we feel 
stripped. [It] tells us we as individuals, and as a nation are inadequate to the 
challenge.” 161 
That is, Kennedy’s 1962 effort to create a new Department of Urban 
Affairs drew criticism that associated federal involvement in domestic 
urban matters, including air pollution, with communism. This was the 
language of the Cold War conservative right. Although pollution control 
was not the primary target of the invective, it was repeatedly held guilty by 
association. The House Health and Safety Subcommittee was unlikely to 
have missed this fact. Among the members of that Committee, all of the 
Republicans and both Southern Democrats, including Rep. Roberts, voted 
against the new department.162 
iii. The House Consolidated Bill (March to June 1962) 
On March 1, 1962, two days after Kennedy’s message on public 
health and a week after the House had defeated Kennedy’s departmental 
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proposal, Rep. Roberts submitted a consensus air pollution bill to the 
House.163 
Textual analysis demonstrates that the new bill was largely a 
reworking of the AMA’s “weak” proposal.164 It incorporated a small but 
significant shift in emphasis for the role of the federal government, as one 
of providing “national leadership in the development of cooperation of 
Federal, State, and local programs for the prevention and control of 
pollution,” and it retained and expanded on the AMA’s proposed 
instructions to the Surgeon General to foster “cooperation” between all 
federal and state authorities working on air pollution, and to support 
research, investigation, and personnel training.165 The grants-in-aid 
program would support the “development, initiation, or improvement” of 
state air pollution control programs.166 The bill’s proposed conference 
process was truncated but consistent with the Flemming proposal. It carried 
an anodyne title that mirrored the federal water pollution law: the “Federal 
Air Pollution Control Act.”167 Taken as a whole, it envisioned the federal 
government as an agent for stimulating and supporting state action on air 
pollution, with an extremely limited federal capacity to mediate when states 
were in conflict. 
Roberts requested agency feedback on the consolidated bill, and 
scheduled House hearings to introduce and discuss it. The executive office 
responses expressed universal support for the bill, citing the President’s 
recent message on health.168 The hearing itself was only a half hour long 
and consisted primarily of supportive statements from interested 
congressmen. In his opening comments, Rep. Roberts mentioned that the 
Surgeon General’s had filed a report on automobile exhaust pollution 
earlier in the month, and that the proposed legislation before the committee 
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would make possible the additional research proposed in that document. It 
appeared that everything was ready to go.169 
iv. Roberts Delays (June to December 1962) 
And then, Roberts killed the consolidated bill. Bailey, ever suspicious 
and believing that Roberts never supported increased federal authority, 
claims that he “used the lack of consensus among the [June 1962 hearing] 
witnesses to suggest that further time was needed to study the proposals.”170 
This is unpersuasive, however, in part because Roberts never said so and in 
part because there was no such lack of witness consensus. Ripley states 
simply that Roberts “by the middle of the summer felt that his 
subcommittee needed more time to study [the proposals in the consolidated 
bill] before approving them.”171 Neither cite Roberts himself, who provided 
his own explanation: 
An administration proposal for a comprehensive program [i.e., 
new authority for PHS] was submitted by the Secretary of 
Health, Education, and Welfare in February 1962. 
Unfortunately, sufficient time for adequate hearings on a 
problem of such far-reaching nature was not available during the 
current session. The Subcommittee on Health and Safety, of 
which I am chairman, did devote sufficient time to the subject, 
however, to conclude that the interests of the country would be 
best served by postponing legislative proposals for a broader 
type of air pollution program until proper hearings can be 
conducted. I wish to give assurance that such hearings will be 
held in time to permit congressional action early in the next 
session . . . . .172 
That is, Roberts located his decision to delay in the inability of his 
committee to hold hearings on the subject of expanded federal power. He 
also then gave his word that he would hold those hearings in the next 
Congressional session. Especially since he did conduct the hearings, and 
then oversaw the passage of an even more robust bill the next year, there 
seems to be sufficient evidence to consider taking him at his word. At the 
time, however, the outcome was that the House delayed consideration of 
any major programs. To accomplish the delay, Roberts introduced a “clean 
bill” to extend the 1955 research program for another two years, which was 
then passed. Thus, at the end of the 1962 legislative action on the matter, 
the only concrete results were a two-year research extension bill. Ripley 
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reports that the administration was upset with this outcome, and that their 
planned air pollution conference – which they had intended as a celebration 
of the enactment of the 1962 law – then needed to be altered. This may have 
been the case among those who were heavily invested in the specifics of 
the proposal, but Kennedy’s legislative team at least chalked it up as a small 
success for the purposes of the coming midterm elections. Kennedy, for his 
part, had his mind on other matters: the Cuban Missile Crisis, the most 
important event of his presidency and arguably of the twentieth century, 
began a week later, and air pollution legislation was not a matter of 
immediate concern to his cabinet.173 
The November 1962 midterm elections did not change the balance of 
power in Congress – the Democratic party retained slim majorities in the 
House and Senate, and Rep. Roberts retained his chairmanship. In rapid 
succession, however, the leadership of the Senate Public Works committee 
changed – long-time chair Sen. Dennis Chavez (D-NM) passed away on 
November 18, 1962, and his replacement as chair, Sen. Robert Kerr (D-
OK) passed away a month later. Sen. Patrick McNamara (D-MI) succeeded 
them, and among his first acts was to appoint a relatively obscure Senator, 
Sen. Edmund Muskie (D-ME), to the Public Works Committee’s newly 
formed Special Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution. Finally, 
Kennedy’s HEW Secretary, Abraham Ribicoff, had resigned to run for 
Senate in Connecticut, and had won. The Senate, then, would gain two 
vocal advocates for air pollution control.174 
v. The Opposition Emerges (December 1962) 
Legislation would have to wait until 1963. But there was still a 
national conference on air pollution to attend. On December 10-12, 1962, 
over 1,500 people convened in Washington, D.C. to discuss the latest 
developments in research and administration – almost 500 of them from 
industry. During this conference a significant debate arose among the 
participants regarding the appropriate role of the federal government in air 
pollution – including the emergence, for the first time, of a coordinated 
opposition to expanded federal power, led by business interests and the 
highly conservative National Association of Manufacturers.175 
The conflict emerged into the open on the conference’s first day, in 
the afternoon’s plenary session. In a framing similar to Kennedy’s recent 
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speech exhorting the nation to land on the moon, Sen. Harrison Williams 
(D-NJ) began to criticize the conference attendees for setting their sights 
too low on air pollution, and of being over-focused on research to the 
detriment of progress.176 He argued that “research is worthless unless it is 
accompanied by a desire and a determination to translate the fruits of it into 
action,” and said that he thought that “our goal ought to be the elimination 
of air pollution by the end of the sixties, and not just the elimination of our 
ignorance about the problem.”177 The “fundamental issues” were “money 
and the enforcement of air pollution control.”178 The states, he said, “are 
often vulnerable to threats by an air pollution industry to move somewhere 
else where, as they say, the public officials are ‘more understanding,’” and 
the federal role was necessary to overcome this.179 His remarks received 
immediate objection from a NAM spokesman, as well as several 
representatives from the pulp and paper industry. NAM had come to 
Washington to promote the pollution control experience in Pittsburgh, 
which, it argued, had demonstrated the possibility of solutions “without 
remote centralized control from Washington.”180 Williams held his ground, 
arguing that he supported “some stimulation” in the area from the federal 
government.181 A representative from Weyerhaeuser quipped that “[i]t’s 
very seldom that the Federal Government stops stimulating, once they start 
stimulating.”182 The conversation then moved on. 
The argument picked up again on the second day, which was devoted 
to panel discussions. The panel on “Applying Our Legislative and 
Regulatory Know-How” tackled the question: “Do we have the legal 
weapons with which to combat air pollution; and, if so, how should we use 
them?”183 In response, Rep. Roberts himself gave a speech he titled “The 
Role To Be Played by the Federal Government.” In it, he appeared to come 
down squarely on the conservative side of the enforcement issue, while 
holding space for an expanded federal role in other respects: “it would seem 
that abatement and enforcement programs to be effective must remain the 
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responsibility of States and local governments, but there is a vast field in 
the area of research and the dissemination of information where the Federal 
Government must continue to take the lead.”184 He prefaced his comments, 
however, by arguing that “no one doubts” that “authority exists to expand 
the Federal role . . . if Congress in its wisdom feels that an expansion is 
necessary and would produce desired results.185 The welfare and commerce 
clauses of the Constitution vest great authority in the Federal Government 
to promote commerce and protect health and property in the public interest. 
. . . We legislate in the field of health to promote the general welfare . . . .”186 
He continued, however, to qualify this: “let me say that I do not think the 
Federal Government has any business telling the people of, say, 
Birmingham or Los Angeles how to proceed to meet their air pollution 
problems.”187 The panel Q&A was dominated by industry speakers, each 
arguing against the federal government’s enforcement authority and 
praising Rep. Roberts’ statement as reflecting their own views.188 
Another sally came that evening, when none other than Arthur 
Flemming took the stage during the dinner. Among other things, he argued 
the same position he had been arguing for years: “the Federal Government 
should be given enforcement authority in air pollution comparable to the 
authority it now has in water pollution.”189 Flemming, however, moved 
beyond his initial proposal, to a position more in line with the legislative 
developments of the last year. After a fact-finding conference, he argued, 
the HEW Secretary  
it seems to me, should have the right to issue orders based on the 
recommendations of the board and which would become 
operative after a reasonable period of time had elapsed. The 
recipients of the orders should have the right to appeal to the 
appropriate U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals within a specified 
period of time. If the orders are not appealed or if they are 
appealed and affirmed but are not complied with, the [HEW 
Secretary] should be able to refer the matter for appropriate 
action to the Department of Justice.190  
This was the procedure in the 1961 FWPCA amendments that had formed 
the basis for the AMA’s “weak” bill, and had been incorporated into the 
House consolidated bill prior to Roberts having killed it. Flemming saw 
“no reason at all” why the federal government should not have the same 
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authority in the air and water pollution contexts.191 To those who disagreed, 
he said: “I submit to you that there is still too much evidence pointing to 
the fact that there are those who put selfish economic interests ahead of the 
health of our Nation and resent and resist the efforts of others who put the 
health of the Nation ahead of all other considerations.”192 He pleaded: 
“Let’s make up our minds that we are going to use all of our resources in 
order to do something significant in this generation. Let’s not wait until 
tragedy again strikes. Let’s get action at the next session of Congress.”193 
The controversy boiled over in the final session. PHS, as was its 
practice at the time, had hired an ABC broadcaster to present a “layman’s 
view” summary of the entire conference, and then had assisted him to 
prepare remarks. The first problem was that they engaged Howard K. 
Smith, an ABC journalist who had recently aired a program titled “The 
Political Obituary of Richard M. Nixon,” The show had been hugely 
controversial, particularly on the conservative right, for its inclusion of 
comments by convicted perjurer and suspected Soviet spy Alger Hiss. And 
then Smith tackled the conference’s debate over federal authority as 
follows: 
I was struck by a rather strange phenomenon. A considerable 
number of the delegates seemed to be vigorously attacking a 
dragon called "Federal enforcement." But in a careful search of 
the papers presented by practicing members of the Federal 
Establishment, I never found the dragon. Nor, I understand, does 
it appear in any of the legislation being proposed by the 
administration. 
 
Actually the clearest call for increased Federal participation has 
come from rather unlikely places. Dr. Flemming, a distinguished 
member of President Eisenhower’s Cabinet, espoused a stronger 
Federal role last night, and the American Medical Association 
mentioned it favorably in [a] telegram to which I have already 
referred . . . . Naively, perhaps, I wonder if the attacks on Federal 
enforcement aren’t really attacks on Federal grants which might 
change dormant programs into active programs. 
 
Besides, when it comes to air pollution, what is local? . . . [O]ur 
jurisdictional lines traced on the surface of the earth have little 
relevance. Even those magical boundaries which separate 
sovereign State from sovereign State cannot check the flow of 
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troubled air. What’s a Federal Government for, if not for 
problems like this?194 
NAM was outraged. It sent a formal complaint to the conference 
organizers, criticizing Smith’s “sensationalized summary of the conference 
which managed to distort many of the facts, dramatize the role of the federal 
government, and undercut the industry, State, and local positions. . . .”195 
Smith had “fully distorted our feeling of the conference’s consensus, 
obtained from the panel summaries, ‘that Federal enforcement was not 
needed and was not wanted.’ It was all the more reprehensible as no chance 
for rebuttal was permitted.”196 PHS responded that NAM’s criticism was 
“regrettable.”197 
It is worth pausing to consider the stakes of this engagement. Between 
the lines of the statements by Sen. Williams and Secretary Flemming was 
the idea that the pace of change on air pollution was too slow, that this was 
the fault of industry, and that it was time to use the federal government to 
change the situation. Williams challenged the participants to eliminate air 
pollution by the end of the 1960s. Flemming accused industry of strong-
arming state governments to prevent progress. Industry responded by 
pointing to Pittsburgh, where major changes had occurred, according to 
industry, without federal interference, through industry-local cooperation. 
NAM believed that the federal government, if empowered to speed the 
elimination of air pollution, might do so without regard to financial impacts 
on industry, and was, as explained above, an organization rather fiercely 
committed to conservative politics, and particularly anti-statist and pro-
capitalist conceptions of U.S. government. The tensions between voluntary 
self-regulation, industry regulatory capture, marketplace incentivization, 
and direct regulation, that would characterize environmental regulation in 
the following decades, began to emerge in 1962, as idealists began to set 
their sights on a moonshot for air pollution, and conservative industry 
sought to defend the status quo. 
F. 1963: CALLING THE QUESTION 
At stake in 1963 was the question that had just been debated at the 
national air pollution conference, that Rep. Roberts’ Subcommittee had 
been asking in various ways for several years, and that had been hinted at 
ever since Donora: should the federal government be allowed to begin 
acting independently to eliminate the nation’s air pollution? As 1963 
began, Rep. Roberts stood in evident doubt, although his commitment to 
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holding hearings on the subject was undeniably genuine. In the Senate, 
Edmund Muskie was gearing up to investigate the question himself. In the 
White House and at PHS, opinions on the subject were mixed. Industry 
opposition had begun to organize. As the year began it was impossible to 
tell how things would end. 
i. Voices of the New Year (January and February 1963) 
As was always the case, the new Congress brought new bills. This 
time, they came from the Senate, and there were two competing proposals. 
The first was almost identical to the prior year’s House consolidated bill. 
The second, submitted by newly sworn-in Sen. Abraham Ribicoff, was a 
major reworking of the older bill.198  
Although in legislation the credit often goes to the person who pushed 
a bill over the finish line, readers of this Article can now perceive the 
Ribicoff bill’s genesis elsewhere. Since it was built on the House 
consolidated bill, it must necessarily be traced to Hugh Mields’ efforts to 
consolidate scattered air pollution authorities and translate FWPCA’s 
pollution control processes, which efforts had been carried forward by 
legislators from both parties from California, New York, Pennsylvania, and 
beyond, for years, and shepherded, however slowly, through Rep. Roberts’ 
committee. This was also true of the Ribicoff bill’s most important “new” 
contribution: a section titled “Enforcement Measures Against Air 
Pollution” that empowered the federal government to call conferences 
when air pollution threatened the public health and welfare, and to initiate 
abatement actions if, in its judgment, timely progress was not made.199 This 
was a near-verbatim copy of the language that had first been introduced in 
the “Halpern” bill in 1961, i.e., the “strong” AMA proposal, i.e., Hugh 
Mields’ translation of FWPCA’s 1961 enforcement provisions. Throughout 
the proceedings that would follow, no legislator would ever discuss this 
provenance. Nonetheless, the urban lobby finally had been successful in 
securing legislative support in its long-running effort to expand the federal 
government’s air pollution enforcement powers.200 
This Congressional support was intertwined with support within the 
Kennedy administration, which endorsed the Ribicoff bill in early 
February. This announcement followed a great deal of debate, dissent, and 
discussion within PHS and Kennedy’s legislative offices, and arguments 
put to Kennedy himself. The administration’s decision was revealed in the 
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1963 health message, which urged the adoption of legislation that would 
authorize PHS to “take action to abate interstate air pollution along the 
general lines of the existing water pollution control enforcement measures.” 
The Democratic administration would thus make its mark in the air 
pollution field by expanding federal power, in accordance with the program 
of the urban lobby, and against anti-statist and pro-business conservative 
opposition. According to Ripley, the details of the enforcement authority 
were less important to the White House legislative office than that “it does 
something, and indicates forward movement” on air pollution.201 
Two weeks later, Rep. Roberts filed his own bill.202 It was, with many 
small amendments, a copy of the Ribicoff bill, and it contained the “strong” 
enforcement language that had now been endorsed in the Senate and by the 
administration. Whatever Roberts had thought of the issue when he spoke 
at the air pollution conference two months earlier, he was not as committed 
to his reasoning as he had appeared. When reminded of his earlier 
statements, Roberts would only say: “. . . there are two views about 
consistency. It has been said that ‘consistency, thou art a jewel.’ It has also 
been said the ‘consistency is a hobgoblin of little minds.’ Finally, someone 
said, ‘The wise man changes his mind and the fool never does.’”203 He also 
referenced a recent severe smog event in London but offered no other 
public explanation. Roberts, a states’ rights advocate, had decided to 
support the expansion of federal power.  
Once Roberts was convinced, the likely outcome changed 
immediately – the bill now had the support of the Democratic party, which 
held the presidency and both houses of Congress, support from a key 
Southern Democrat to sway the more conservative members of that party, 
and enough support among moderate Republicans to survive any 
Democratic defections. It was time to conduct a hearing, bring the matter 
to the floor, and call the question. This would be facilitated by one final key 
change introduced in the Ribicoff bill, and carried forward into Rep. 
Roberts’ bill and all subsequent versions of the law: a better title. What had 
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been “the Federal Air Pollution Control Act” would now be called “the 
Clean Air Act of 1963.”204 
ii. The Opposition Speaks (March 1963)  
In March 1963, the House Health and Safety Subcommittee heard two 
days of testimony squarely on the question of whether the federal 
government should expand its air pollution program – and especially 
whether an expanded program should include new enforcement authorities 
like those now proposed in the Clean Air Act. Of particular interest, the 
Subcommittee heard a series of arguments in opposition to the bill – the 
first time that opponents of federal air pollution legislation had presented 
their arguments in such a forum. 
With Kennedy’s health message as guidance, the bill received strong 
support from all of the federal executive offices.205 Whatever the prior 
internal debate had been, PHS head Ivan Nestingen began the proceedings 
with a policy argument for federal abatement authority, which he described 
as “law enforcement” and likened to other air pollution control 
mechanisms.206 He said that although the power was to be used sparingly, 
it would be necessary for overall success of any air pollution control 
program: “Generally speaking, enforcement is the last control device to be 
applied, and it will be required in only a few situations in most 
communities”207 but “[w]hen such actions are required . . . it is of the utmost 
importance that they be soundly based and forcefully prosecuted. 
Otherwise they will command no respect, either in the community or in the 
courts, with the result that the total control program will lose force and 
effectiveness.208 The “exercise of commonsense and good judgment will 
minimize the situations that will require such actions to be brought,” but 
were necessary now because “we are just not moving fast enough” on air 
pollution.209 “In the industrial and technical revolution, which is occurring 
in our modern times, and will continue in the immediate years ahead, we 
will not move fast enough unless there is greater federal authority in this 
field.”210 Nestingen did not address the fact that under the new law the 
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federal government would not have any other air pollution control 
mechanisms at its disposal. 
Against this overall justification, and among a great deal of additional 
supportive testimony from friendly witnesses, two interest groups 
presented their opposition, one each from government and industry.211 The 
government opposition came first from the states wary of municipal-federal 
dealings that would undercut the states’ powers and articulated the National 
Association of Attorneys General. The State AGs described the law’s 
proposed conference authority as “a roving commission [for PHS] to study 
and criticize the actions of particular agencies of a State or local 
government in its own discretion,” which would “encourage friction and 
irresponsibility,” which, they argued, could “do severe damage to, or even 
completely subvert State and local efforts to regulate polluters.”212 They 
argued that the bill should focus solely on promoting interstate cooperation, 
rather than providing “machinery for ousting of local and State 
jurisdiction . . . on the basis of administrative discretion.”213 Other 
opponents in government pointed to negative experiences with the 
conferences that had already been held under FWPCA. To state politicians, 
the problem with this was “that the local agencies, interstate agency and the 
States were indicted as far as the public was concerned, and most of them 
never read that [the PHS review concluded that] there was an active [i.e., 
sufficient, air pollution control] program taking place.”214 The 
Subcommittee was generally sympathetic to these concerns and discussed 
their intention to place clear limits on the circumstances under which 
federal enforcement could occur.215 
Industrial interests (except for manufacturers of pollution control 
devices) were hostile to the bill. Some submitted brief but strongly worded 
oppositional statements. The California Chamber of Commerce argued: 
“Much of the bill is an unwarranted (and probably unconstitutional) 
intervention into a legislative area reserved by the Constitution to the 
various States.”216 The Farm Bureau Federation submitted a warning 
against “yield[ing] to the pressure of federalization and further debas[ing] 
our currency with unbalanced budgets in the process of finding the 
complete answer to air pollution.”217 But by far the most coordinated 
opposition came from the National Association of Manufacturers. 
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The NAM arguments against the Clean Air Act were delivered by 
Daniel W. Cannon, an attorney who had started his legal career at a coal 
mining subsidiary of U.S. Steel and later become general counsel of the 
Bituminous Coal Operators Association, who had joined NAM in 1958 and 
who would later serve as NAM’s director of environmental affairs.218 
Following the December 1962 air pollution conference, at which Cannon 
had been one of the industry interlocuters on the topic of air enforcement 
powers, NAM had published a short opinion piece in its association journal, 
titled “Local Action Best on Air Pollution,” that gave a preview of its 
position: 
Well, we can still breathe, can’t we—without federal 
supervision? Yes, but perhaps not for long. Despite the marked 
success local communities have had in curbing air pollution, 
attempts have been made and will be renewed to put the federal 
government in control of the air in our own back yards – at the 
enormous expense federal programs usually call for. . . .  
 
From all past experience in fighting air pollution, one fact is 
clear: the surest and most effective way to combat air pollution 
is through cooperative community action.  
 
This has been proved, in a most difficult test – the Pittsburgh-
Allegheny County smoke abatement campaign. But that is not 
all; the methods used in what used to be called “the Smoky City” 
are being successfully demonstrated in many other American 
communities.219 
According to a NAM publication titled “Cinderella city,” industry in 
Pittsburgh had voluntarily spent millions on pollution control and, in 
cooperation with local authorities and the citizenry, had taken a series of 
largely voluntary actions that had transformed the city’s air. In contrast, 
NAM pointed to instances of where PHS’s conduct of water pollution 
conferences had created conflict with state and local authorities – in Ohio, 
in Maine and New Hampshire, in Washington state, and in New York and 
New Jersey. NAM then presented a variety of prior statements in support 
of state and local control on pollution – beginning with the first section of 
the 1955 Air Pollution Control Act and ending with Rep. Roberts’ own 
nearly identical statement only three months earlier.220 In other words, 
according to NAM, the traditional way could work and was already federal 
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policy in air pollution; the new water pollution control paradigm had 
problems and should not be expanded too hastily to the air pollution control 
context. Other industry organizations agreed and presented variations on 
NAM’s arguments. The Manufacturing Chemists’ Association argued that 
the air pollution problem was different from water pollution, and therefore 
should not be subject to similar authorities. The American Petroleum 
Institute and Western Oil and Gas Association submitted that federal 
requirements would place decisions in the hands of unaccountable, 
unelected officials who would not take account of local economic factors. 
Bethlehem Steel elaborated: 
[This is] more than a States rights proposition. We feel that the 
State and local governments are far more familiar with the 
interests within the State and its communities, their economies, 
and their problems than is the Federal Government. State and 
local authorities will more readily receive the cooperation of the 
polluters in those communities . . . ; they will be able more 
successfully to persuade the polluters to make the necessary 
corrections, and they will be more readily received when 
enforcement measures shall be required to be taken. The Federal 
Government, on the other hand, will be a relative stranger to all 
these matters, will be looked upon with some suspectedness and 
lack of cooperation, and will run into a militant opposition 
should it attempt to saddle a community with some uniform 
standards that may be predicated upon studies and conditions in 
a removed out-of-State community but is not compatible with 
the economy and the best interests of the community 
involved. . . .221 
That is, federal intervention would be confronted with local hostility 
and would not factor in local economic interests. The Idaho Mining 
Association, the National Coal Association, the American Pulp & Paper 
Association, and the American Mining Congress all agreed.222 Thus, 
industry resorted to careful arguments on the value of local government, 
and located opposition primarily in local anti-statist interests who would 
not accept the imposition of federal standards. These groups also, of course, 
faced federal regulation of their operations under any new national air 
pollution control law. In response, there was evidence presented to the 
committee on the cost of industry compliance, assuring concerned members 
that in Pittsburgh and California no business had been forced to close due 
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to new air pollution regulations.223 The record does not indicate whether 
industrial interests found this comforting, but it is doubtful.  
iii. The Muskie Treatment (September 1963) 
Following the March 1963 hearing, Roberts prepared a revised bill, 
which made minor amendments to the prior version, including several 
additional checks on the federal government’s enforcement authority in 
response to hearing comments, but which was almost entirely unresponsive 
to the statements of the state and industrial opposition.224 It passed the 
House after a strong debate (see discussion next section) and was then sent 
to the Senate, where it arrived before Senator Muskie’s newly formed 
Special Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution. These were the first air 
pollution hearings in the Senate since 1955 and there was a great deal of 
catching up to do. The majority of testimony therefore was redundant to 
what had already been presented in the House, and a great deal of it was 
supportive and, for the purposes of this discussion, relatively 
uninteresting.225 The fireworks began on the third day. 
The Special Subcommittee had been working since January and had 
already gained a reputation for the “warmth” of its welcome. The most 
striking difference was the tone of Senator Muskie’s questions toward 
special interests appearing before him to oppose legislation. Throughout his 
work in the House, Rep. Roberts had been invariably polite to his witnesses, 
and particularly solicitous to those who did not support federal legislation. 
If he was not deferential, he also did not interrupt, and was never rude. 
Senator Muskie took a different approach. When confronted with hostile 
witnesses, he treated them that way, cross-examined them, interrupted 
them, and argued with them. He went through their statements in detail and 
criticized the language they used, the arguments they made, and the people 
they sent. And he was always well prepared. 
Together with Sen. Neuberger from Oregon, who was not a member 
of the committee but was invited for the occasion, Muskie spent hours 
grilling the Manufacturing Chemists’ Association and the National 
Association of Manufacturers, particularly, on the positions discussed 
above, and had relatively heated discussions with a number of other 
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industry representatives.226 The transcripts are entertaining, but it is also 
important to consider that the confrontational approach was new, and 
although it was to become a hallmark of environmental politics, the 
industry representatives speaking before Congress in 1963 were caught 
quite off guard by it. Their pro-business perspectives would no longer be 
accepted unchallenged. Although much more could be said about Sen. 
Muskie – and his entry into the field representing an important transition 
that would redefine not only the politics of the environment, but also the 
politics of opposition to environmental regulation – his impact on the Clean 
Air Act of 1963, in the end, was minimal. There was never any doubt the 
Senate would pass it. As had been the case for much of the last decade, the 
real story happened in the House. 
iv. Votes and Passage (July to December 1963) 
The Clean Air Act’s final passage required a debate and vote in the 
House, followed by a debate and vote in the Senate, a conference between 
the House and Senate to reconcile the two versions of the bill, and 
subsequent debates and votes in the House and Senate on whether to accept 
the conference bill. These occurred in stages, with the first House debate 
and vote – the most important – actually conducted before the Senate 
hearings discussed in the prior section. The final votes occurred in 
November and December 1963.227 
The most important of these was the House vote in July 1963. The 
final vote was 273 in support, 102 against, with 53 voting “present.” 206 
Democrats and 67 Republicans voted for the bill. The majority of the “no” 
votes were Republicans, while the majority of the “present” votes were 
Democrats.228 However, given that both parties contained a range of 
ideologies, it is useful to examine the outcome in more detail. In particular, 
it is possible by 1963 to determine the most conservative members of the 
House by reference to an ideological index score assigned to them by 
Americans for Constitutional Action (the “ACA Index”).229 Using these 
scores as a guide, it is clear that party and conservative political voting 
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scores were the two primary predictive factors in the vote. In general, the 
Democratic House members supported the bill, while Republican house 
members did not. However, all else being equal, conservative Democrats 
and Republicans (based on their ACA scores) were less likely to support 
the bill than their liberal or moderate counterparts in both parties.230 
Although the only identifiable geographic pattern in the total vote was 
a strong tendency for Californians to support the bill, it becomes clearer 
when the Republican vote is examined alone. Republican opposition was 
concentrated in the Midwest and plains states, but this was to be expected 
given that Republicans dominated those delegations. What is more 
remarkable is that Republicans from California, New York, Pennsylvania, 
and Wisconsin – i.e., states with major air pollution problems, and one with 
major water pollution problems – were significantly more likely to vote 
“yes” than Republicans in other states.231 What is also remarkable is that 
the vote demonstrated a major shift among the Southern Democrats. Of the 
ten Democratic “no” votes, eight were from Arkansas, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas. But overall, these state delegations 
supported the bill – a deviation from their positions on, among other things, 
the recent vote on the Department of Urban Affairs, and the upcoming vote 
on the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It is possible that Rep. Roberts’ 
sponsorship swayed the Southern Democrats, who supported a bill that was 
developed by one of their own. In the end of the debate, dozens of Southern 
legislators otherwise opposed to the expansion of federal power voted to 
permit PHS to begin to fight air pollution in the states. 
Following the Senate hearings, some work remained to finalize the 
final details of the bill, but the overall program would not change from this 
point forward. The Senate debate and vote took place on November 19, 
1963. Although one Senator shared that he had received industry concerns, 
these were allayed in that chamber by minor amendments from the floor, 
which were agreed to, and the Senate bill was passed unanimously and sent 
to conference to be worked out. In her argument for the bill, Sen. Neuberger 
used terminology that was not yet widespread, but that would become 
increasingly more so in the years to come: “we are about to come of age in 
our relationship with our environment.”232 Environmentalism had come to 
Congress.  
 
230.  [analysis on file with author]. A linear regression of “yes” votes against 
Democratic party membership, strong liberal voting record, strong conservative voting 
record, and voter state showed that democrats were much more likely to vote “yes,” while 
conservatives were much more likely to vote “no.” 
231.  [analysis on file with author]. A linear regression of Republican “yes” vote 
against strong liberal voting record, strong conservative voting record, and voter state 
showed that Republicans from California, New York, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin were 
more likely to vote “yes” than Republicans elsewhere. 






Three days later, President Kennedy was assassinated. The conference 
between the Senate and the House resulted in a bill that was largely 
consistent with the Senate’s version, and a second House vote largely 
acquiesced to the amendments, except for the loss of several additional 
Southern Democratic representatives. President Johnson signed the bill into 
law on December 17, 1963.  
CONCLUSION – THE BALANCE OF POWER SHIFTS 
In summary, between 1948 and 1963 Congress considered whether 
the federal government should have any independent air pollution 
abatement power, and eventually decided that it should, albeit under strict 
limitations. At the time, there was already good evidence that the resulting 
procedural thicket was not going to work very well. But the details of the 
process were never as important as the fact that the federal government 
would have some power to eliminate pollution. Smoke abatement and the 
local approach had failed. The federal government thus would become 
committed not only to researching air pollution, but to “doing something” 
about it. It was clear that many technical details of such a program remained 
to be worked out – including defensible ambient air quality standards and 
emissions criteria for key pollutants – but these developments would now 
be driven not as a basic research program, but as a national program in the 
name of public health and the environment. 
This transition should be understood as an element of the Kennedy 
administration’s “new frontier” domestic legislative program, and more 
broadly as a reflection of Kennedy’s conception of the use of government 
to improve society. Although it was never a major priority for the 
administration, it nonetheless was part of a larger and purposeful shift 
toward a more proactive and reformist vision of the role of the federal 
government in domestic affairs, and a rejection of the conservative view of 
the role of government in the United States. Although the Kennedy 
administration was content to let others innovate on the legislative 
particulars, it was open to bold proposals, and supportive of urban interests 
that themselves were frustrated with the limits of traditionalist federalism. 
The states were not eager to cede their power to the “bureaucrats in 
Washington.” Businesses, as well, wished to avoid federal intervention. 
And yet this opposition was outmaneuvered, and the principle of federal 
primacy in air pollution abatement was first established, in 1963. 
This was the conclusion of over a decade of debate on the question of 
federal power in the air pollution context. After the Donora incident, there 
had been interest in using the federal government to investigate and resolve 
disputes, but PHS preferred a larger basic research mandate while working 
in its traditional role to support states who were responsible for 






expanding federal social programs but interest in research, the Eisenhower 
administration agreed, and the first consensus was to maintain prevailing 
local-state-federal relationships. Prior to 1960, there were sporadic 
challenges to this consensus, including a key contribution from HEW 
Secretary Arthur S. Flemming, but no sustained effort to initiate major 
changes. In 1960, Kennedy’s election provided the urban lobby with new 
opportunities for legislative entrepreneurship, and the AMA, and 
particularly one persistent person at the AMA, Hugh Mields, provided key 
legislative language to Congress and the administration, and then worked 
from 1960 to 1963 to sustain calls for the federal government to “do 
something” about air pollution. Although broader efforts at federal 
intervention in urban affairs faced stiff opposition in the early 1960s, air 
pollution legislation was facilitated by existing water pollution precedents, 
and was conceptually separated from other “urban” problems into a distinct 
category of issue that garnered wider support, or at least less resistance to 
federal power.  
Key legislative entrepreneurs included James J. Murphy (D-NY), 
Rep. Helen Gahagan Douglas (D-CA), Sen. Thomas Kuchel (R-CA), 
Secretary Arthur S. Flemming (HEW), and, above all, Hugh Mields, Jr. of 
the American Municipal Association. Key advocates for legislation 
included Rep. Paul Schenck (R-OH), and, at the end of the process, Sen. 
Abraham Ribicoff (D-CT) and Sen. Edmund Muskie (D-ME). Rep. Roberts 
emerges as a problematic and difficult figure to assess – a states’ rights 
advocate apparently devoted to ideals of public testimony and, ultimately, 
legislation for the public welfare. In 1964, he would vote “no” on the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, and would then go on to lose the November 1964 
election to a Republican, as Alabama voters turned against the Democratic 
Party for its support of civil rights, in a larger pattern of southern political 
realignment that marked national politics thereafter. 
The old guard conservatives had their say during the Eisenhower 
administration, but by 1960, particularly with the death of Robert Taft and 
Barry Goldwater still emerging as a national figure, fiscal conservatism was 
at a low ebb in the early 1960s. The fiscal concerns of the Eisenhower 
Administration were not seriously or consistently pursued in the years that 
followed, and thus those arguments had little eventual purchase on the final 
debate. Nor, however, was air pollution successfully associated with state 
control and communism, although attempts were made along these lines. 
Instead, the states’ rights perspective of the Southern Democrats, 
particularly, and anti-federalists, generally, looms large. Ultimately, it is 
clear that at the time, the Southern Democrats opposed judicial intervention 
in Southern apartheid, but also argued for the dominance of Congress, and 
had no theoretical qualms with the exercise of federal power to resolve 






conservative” than the “Jeffersonians” and other more absolutist, anti-
statist conservatives, who would come to power in the years ahead. 
The subsequent implementation of the 1963 Act’s abatement 
procedures has left the impression that they were less important than they 
actually were. They were amended in 1965 (allowing for abatement of 
pollution causing health harms abroad),233 and again in 1967 (permitting 
HEW to create regional ambient air quality standards and take independent 
abatement actions based on them).234 This procedure remained after the 
1970 amendments, but only for air pollutants for which no primary or 
secondary national ambient air quality standard were promulgated.235 In its 
place, the new amendments created a far more powerful direct enforcement 
procedure.236 This new power maintained a nominal cooperative federalism 
by tying enforcement to violations of state-developed State Implementation 
Plans, but, together with a much more aggressive enforcement policy at the 
newly created Environmental Protection Agency, would be tantamount to 
federal control of air pollution down to the local level from 1970 onwards. 
It is true that during its seven years as the primary source of federal 
authority to control air pollution, the 1963 abatement procedures resulted 
in few direct federal abatement actions.237 This, however, ignores the fact 
that the implementation of these procedures had to overcome an enormous 
amount of institutional resistance to federal authority. That they were not 
used extensively did not mean that they were not important. In fact, without 
the efforts and arguments leading to the abatement compromises of the 
1963 Act, and the subsequent experiences with the challenges of 
implementation of those solutions, the stronger enforcement provisions of 
the 1970 Act could never have become law.  
In 1963, then, the United States chose to begin to empower its federal 
government to control air pollution because the alternative – fragmentary 
 
233.  Civil Rights Act of 1963, Pub. L. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992 (1965) (redesignating the 
1963 Act’s § 3 to § 103, and adding § 103(e)). 
234.  Civil Rights Act of 1967, Pub. L. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967) §§ 107(a), (b)(1). 
235.  Civil Rights Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-604, § 4 (B) renumbering Clean Air Act § 
108 to § 115, and amending. In 1977, it was limited further to international air pollution. 
Pub. L. 95-95, 91 Stat. 710, § 114. It still remains in the law as an intriguing section of the 
Clean Air Act for the purposes of regulating greenhouse gas emissions. See Roger Martella 
& Matthew Paulson, Regulation of Greenhouse Gases Under Section 115 of the Clean Air 
Act, 40 Env't Rep. (BNA) 585 (Mar. 13, 2009).  
236.  Civil Rights Act of 1970 § 113. 
237.  See Stern, supra note 4 (“By the time of the next major revision of the Clean Air 
Act in 1967, there had been no request to the Secretary for intrastate pollution abatement 
and only three requests for federal intervention in interstate pollution abatement. The 
Secretary initiated five interstate abatement actions on his own recognizance. Very little air 
pollution abatement was actually accomplished by these procedures, which were later 
abandoned.”). The sole federal decision leaving a record of such proceedings is United 







local control – was not working. The first solution, to maintain a 
cooperative state-federal abatement program largely in control of state 
decisionmakers, also did not work. But having taken the first steps in 1963, 
it was possible for Congress to enact more robust federal enforcement 
powers in 1970. The Clean Air Act of 1963, then, deserves to be recognized 
as more than a funding bill, and more than an unsuccessful predecessor to 
the 1970 law. It was the foundation upon which later generations built. 
 
Author’s note: this Article was written and edited under the San Francisco 
Bay Area’s shelter-in-place order during the novel coronavirus pandemic, 
summer 2020 to spring 2021. Among other things, it suggests further 
research that would require in-person investigation that cannot be 
conducted with our nation’s archives closed. Although the challenges of 
scholarship are one of the least important problems of the day, if any event 
has ever demonstrated the value of federal coordination of a response to a 
nationwide public health problem, it has been the COVID-19 catastrophe. 
National coordination, and when required federal preemption, would have 
spared our country much of its ongoing suffering. As Howard K. Smith 
might have said: “What’s a federal government for, if not for problems like 
this?”  
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